UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAPAL EFFORTS FOR PEACE UNDER BENEDICT XII, 1334-1342

HELEN JENKINS

A THESIS

IN HISTORY

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILADELPHIA

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For My Brother

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I

Need for Peace, 1334–1342

In the eight years from 1334 to 1342 there was great need for peace. These were "troublous times when conflicts break forth in all corners of the world."[1] Thus grieved the peace-loving monk who happened to be pope at the time. Only too well Benedict XII knew that from Scotland to Sicily, from Portugal to Poland, Christendom was engaged in war. Each year of his pontificate saw a new war begun, or an old one resumed. There were dynastic struggles in Germany, internecine strife in Italy, civil war in Spain and Flanders, and feudal quarrels everywhere. Most conspicuous and elaborate of all, perhaps, was the Hundred Years' War which began to trouble northwestern Europe about 1337.

Preceding and contributing to this struggle between England and France came the Anglo-Scottish war. A new impetus to an old feud had been given in 1332 when Baliol, Edward III's henchman, was crowned at Scone. By 1335, the year of Benedict XII's coronation, Edward had personally invaded Scotland four times in five years; and this average he maintained—in person or by proxy—until 1342.[2] Between English invasions, Scotland was further afflicted by the militant antagonism of the supporters of her two duly-crowned kings; and this to such extent that at different times both Baliol and Bruce were forced to flee for safety. Twice the former scurried to England; and twice his "Lord Superior" sought to reseat him on the empty Scottish throne.[3] Although the young Bruce (David II) fled but once, he left early and stayed late.[4] For seven years he sojourned in

[1] Benedict XII to Philip VI, May 25, 1336. G. Daumet (ed.), *Benoît XII, 1334–1342, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales se rapportant à la France*, No. 184.

[2] J. Mackintosh, *History of Civilization in Scotland*, I, 306.

[3] In 1333 and 1339. W. J. Lowe, "Considerations which induced Edward III to assume the title King of France." (An. Rep. of Amer. Hist. Assoc., 1900, Vol. I.) 554, ff.

[4] From 1334 to 1341.

France, where his ally Philip VI ostentatiously welcomed him, to the profound irritation of Edward III.

A second conflict which distressed the pope centered in Flanders. Like Scotland, Flanders was torn both by discord at home and intrigue abroad. Philip VI and Edward III vied with each other in their attempts to secure the support of the Flemings in the Anglo-French war which was about to begin. In 1336, Count Louis of Flanders, at length nagged into partisanship by his overlord Philip VI, ordered the seizure of all Englishmen in Flanders. Swiftly Edward III responded in kind, and placed an embargo on wool. After fifteen months, the wool-weaving Flemings, deprived of employment, at length hearkened to Edward. Meanwhile a popular uprising broke forth, bringing into prominence Jacques van Artevelde. Under his guidance the Flemings obtained the expulsion of their Count,[5] an alliance with England, and wool for their looms. Partly to salve the conscience of his new allies, Edward III, at Van Artevelde's suggestion, now took the title of King of France, thereby making war certain, and peace doubtful.

The discord between England and France, which had long been brewing, involved not only Philip VI and Edward III, but as many of their neighbors as could be coaxed or bought by the eager belligerents. For at least two years before the war actually began, this bidding for allies went zealously on. Aid was sought from the Scots and Castilians, Germans and Netherlanders, Genoese and Pisans. Sooner or later, on one side or the other, all gave help—though generally indirect, belated, and small. The early years of this stubborn struggle were characterized more by pillaging than fighting, yet included the sieges of Cambrai and Tournai, and the naval battle of Sluys. Toward the end of Benedict's pontificate, the Truce of Esplechin was concluded, only to be shortly broken over the question of the Breton succession. During this initial period of the Hundred Years' War the making of peace was doubly difficult because of the alliances, which spread the war, and the pillaging, which cloaked its beginnings.

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[5] *Chroniques et Annales de Flandres* (ed. P. d'Oudegherst), 165.

Another conflict which disturbed the peace of Christendom was going on in Germany where war still sprang from the doubtful position of Louis of Bavaria. It was Benedict XII's misfortune to inherit the quarrel between Empire and Papacy which had progressed with increasing bitterness under his predecessor, John XXII. Louis of Bavaria had fallen into heresy originally because he claimed the imperial throne merely by virtue of his election to it, even though John had consistently denied his title and refused to confirm the election. John and Louis, being an obstinate pair, thereupon spent ten years defying each other. The pope excommunicated the emperor and placed Germany under interdict, thereby heightening dynastic strife. Louis retaliated by invading Italy and creating Peter of Corbaria anti-pope, who docilely approved Louis' election. The struggle continued until John's death, both emperor and pope remaining firm in their mutual antagonism.[6]

However when Benedict XII became pope, Louis had high hopes of reconciliation with the Holy See. He sent embassy after embassy to the new pope protesting his good faith. Although Benedict at first was inclined to deal leniently with the emperor, he found the latter's heresies difficult to forgive. On various pretexts, therefore, the pope postponed from month to month, and from year to year, the reconciliation Louis apparently desired. It is possible that Benedict's hesitation was aggravated by French influence combined with the persuasions of Robert of Naples, who looked askance at the exploits of the "imperial vicars" who seemed bent on mastering Italy. Louis, however, was not without support in Germany. In 1338 the Germans, weary of French and papal meddling, declared that their king required no confirmation from any Italian or French bishop, even of Rome. It was while the country was in this temper that Louis, at the Diet of Coblentz, invested Edward III with the title of "Imperial Vicar" for the territory west of the Rhine. This action served only to stiffen French and papal opposition to Louis. Thus, although the papacy strove to foster peace among Christians, it adopted a

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[6] C. Müller, *Der Kampf Ludwigs des Bayern mit der römischen Kurie*, I.

militant attitude toward Louis of Bavaria's politico-religious heterodoxy.[7]

If Germany was upset partly because of papal interference, Italy was even more disturbed partly as a result of the absence of the papacy. Varied conflicts shook the peninsula. In Rome, the powerful Colonna and Orsini struggled for supremacy. Lombardy was overrun by the Visconti and Mastino Della Scala, whom Venice and Florence joined to defeat. An old alliance engaging Siena and Bologna to maintain the Guelf party in Florence kept alive the old antagonism of Guelf and Ghibbeline. In 1339, Florence herself was forced to withdraw from war because of the ruin to her commerce occasioned partly by the financing of the Hundred Years' War. In Bologna, civil strife caused the expulsion of various papal legates sent there to preserve order. Genoa too, was the scene of a civil war which broke out partly as a result of the presence of disorderly Genoese mercenaries who had hired out to England, France, and Spain, and had now returned. Papal power in Italy was almost destroyed. Benedict, it is true, received the homage of Robert for Naples,[8] and of Alphonso IV of Aragon for Sardinia,[9] but Frederick of Trinacre refused to do homage to him for Sicily.[10] Sicily itself was the centre of conflict caused by the conflicting claims to the island made by the House of Aragon, represented by Peter, and the House of Anjou, represented by Robert of Naples. The king of Naples was perhaps the only power in Italy at this time who might have effectively supported the papal cause. Unfortunately for Benedict, Robert's attempts to regain Sicily for his house combined with his personal ambitions elsewhere left him little time or energy for the furthering of papal power in Italy.

In the Spanish peninsula, this period saw wars between Castile and Portugal, and between Aragon and Majorca, along with internal discord in all. On his death in 1336, Alphonso IV of Aragon left to his successor, Pedro IV, both the domestic

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[7] The relations between Benedict and Louis are fully discussed in Müller *op. cit.*, II.
[8] Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, Vol. XVI, an. 1335, No. 51.
[9] *Ibid.*, an. 1335, No. 43.
[10] *Ibid.*, an. 1335, No. 43.

and foreign conflicts in which he had been engaged. The struggle, but poorly concealed, between Aragon and Majorca, broke out anew under Pedro who proceeded to annex Cerdagne and Roussillon to his kingdom, to the chagrin of James III who had hoped by playing off his French and Aragonese overlords to maintain the kingdom of Majorca intact. At this time the kingdom of Castile and Leon was ruled by the powerful Alphonso XI whose domestic infelicities threatened to disturb his own realm, and actually brought him to war with Portugal. The pope was sorely troubled by the conflicts in Spain, especially since it was being threatened by the infidel. The making of peace in this part of Christendom appeared to Benedict as a religious duty, since Spain was the last outpost of Christendom. It was therefore the duty of the Spanish monarchs to neglect their private quarrels, compose their differences, and unite against their common enemy—the Moors. Great was the satisfaction of Benedict when Aragon, Castile, and Portugal, finally awakened to the peril to themselves of a Moorish invasion, at last united to defeat the Moors at Tarifa. (October 30, 1340.)

Along with these spectacular conflicts which from 1334 to 1342 harried the peoples of Christendom, sober efforts for peace were made. Such efforts, though usually and more consistently emanating from the pope, were sometimes made by secular princes. Benedict, however, was apt to frown on such attempts, believing them to be more harmful than helpful to the cause of peace. He felt that the problem of mediation between warring princes properly belonged to the pope by virtue of his position.

Nevertheless, secular efforts for peace were made. The most conspicuous example during this period was the attempt of Philip VI to bring about peace between England and Scotland. His fitness for the rôle of mediator was challenged by Benedict at the time,[11] and may be questioned now. In view of the French king's open hospitality to the renegade Bruce together with his more practical aid to the Scots against Edward III, one may well doubt the sincerity of Philip's efforts for peace. His action was at worst hypocritical; and at best, quixotic. Perhaps he wished, by

[11] Daumet, No. 90.

talking peace, to somehow conceal from Edward his own plans for war. Again, he may have hoped to postpone—until better prepared—the inevitable conflict with England. Probably too, as Froissart suggests, Philip sought to make French approval a condition for any Anglo-Scottish truce, thereby increasing his own prestige.[12]

Whatever may have been his motives, Philip was active in sending his envoys to England for the express purpose of mediating between England and Scotland. Apparently the French representatives had some effect, for it was at their request that on March 23, 1335, Edward wrote his bailiffs granting safe conduct to thirty Scots to come to England to treat with the nuncios of the king of France regarding a truce.[13] In April of the same year Edward, again at the request of Philip's envoys, granted them permission to consult with two messengers from Scotland regarding the proclamation of a truce which was to last from Easter to the feast of the Nativity of St. John the Baptist. During this truce, Edward promised not to offend in any way in Scotland out of reverence for the king of France.[14] Apparently this truce was concluded as a concession to secular mediation.

Philip, however, was not to be the only arbiter in this dispute.[15] In July, 1335, the pope and the College, after mature deliberation, decided that the papacy itself would assume the rôle of mediator; they felt the cause of peace would be better served if Philip did not intervene. The reason assigned for this action was the hesitation felt by Benedict "to have truces signed which he would have the sorrow of seeing violated the next day." Undoubtedly the pontiff had in mind the flagrant violation of the recently concluded Anglo-Scottish truce, a violation to which Philip of France contributed by aiding the Scots against Edward.

Puzzled at Philip's apparent inconsistency in arranging for peace and war at the same time, Benedict reproached him for it. The French king, therefore, was at great pains to explain

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[12] *Chroniques de Froissart* (ed. S. Luce), I, 147.
[13] Rymer, *Foedera*, II, 903.
[14] *Ibid.*, 903.
[15] Philip at this time suggested to Edward that the pope mediate between England and Scotland; Edward refused. Continuation of *Gesta Edwardi de Carnarvon*, 124–126.

to the pope the reasons for his action. According to previous treaties, pacts, and conventions existing between his predecessors and those of David II, the king of France was bound by oath to assist the Scots against England. Philip's citing of these treaties, involving as they did the oaths of the contracting parties, forced the pope into an uncomfortable dilemma: he must sacrifice either the sanctity of the oath or the cause of peace. Benedict did neither. He upheld the sanctity of the oath, admitting that obligations contracted under oath would be difficult to elude. On the other hand, he appealed to Philip's common sense by pointing out the practical difficulties which would attend the king should he attempt to carry out his oath to aid the Scots. Should Philip feel bound to carry out the letter of these pacts, the pope warned him to remember that there were many discontented barons already anxious to ally themselves with the king of England against David II, and thus against the king of France.[16]

It is clear from this reply of Benedict's that he spoke both as a churchman and a statesman. While putting himself on record as upholding the validity of the oath, he still appeared far-sighted enough to warn Philip of the dangers involved in adhering strictly to the provisions of the treaties. Benedict here distinguished between the oath itself which was sacred, and the follies of the obligations which the oath supported. It was the kind of distinction which would have delighted the Scholastics a generation before.

At the same time, the pope made it clear to Philip that he disapproved of secular mediation in general, and of Philip's attempts in particular: "it is not fitting for you, a secular prince, to bring harmony to two kings who are at war; for, should it happen that you would take the part of one, the other will have no more confidence in you and the work of peace will be ruined forever."[17] Benedict sincerely feared that Philip's poorly disguised partiality in this dispute would quickly turn the Anglo-Scottish conflict into an Anglo-French one. Wishing to avoid by all means such a

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[16] Daumet, No. 90.
[17] Daumet, No. 90.

disaster, the pope sent two nuncios to England to try their hand at making peace between England and Scotland.[18] At the same time he wrote to Edward urging him to make peace with the Scots.[19] However, before the papal envoys reached England, a convention had already been signed at Perth between the two countries.[20]

It was not until the late autumn of 1335 that the papal nuncios arrived in England. During the next six months a series of truces were signed between England and Scotland, all apparently brought about through both French and papal mediation.[21] In November, 1335, a truce was made to last until Christmas, and it was agreed that six Scots with forty armed men should meet the papal, French, and English representatives at Newcastle to deliberate regarding peace.[22] Shortly before Christmas, the truce was prolonged to January 25, 1336.[23] Meanwhile the French and papal ambassadors had appointed five persons to regulate Anglo-Scottish differences.[24] On January 23rd, the truces were prolonged for six days more.[25] Three days later it was arranged that David Bruce should send six persons representing him to London in order to confer with the English, papal, and French envoys.[26] On the same day, the truce was again prolonged, to April 14, 1336.[27] Before the truce had expired, however, it was, in March, once more extended.[28]

Apparently these truces were taken none too seriously by either the Scots or the English, and certainly not by the French. At best they were supposed to guarantee only the temporary cessation of fighting, and made no provision for a more permanent peace. It is interesting to note that although Benedict had complained to Philip that the truces brought about through secular

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[18] *Ibid.*, No. 89.
[19] *Calendar of Papal Registries*, II, 558.
[20] Robert of Avesbury, *De gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi tertii* (ed. Thompson), 299–300.
[21] Murimuth, 77–79; *Annales Paulini*, 364.
[22] Rymer, II, 926.
[23] *Ibid.*, II, 927.
[24] *Ibid.*, II, 928.
[25] *Ibid.*, II, 929.
[26] *Ibid.*, II, 930–931 (January 26, 1336).
[27] *Ibid.*, II, 930–931.
[28] *Ibid.*, II, 933.

mediation were made only to be broken the next day, the truces brought about through papal arbitration were broken quite as often. In April, 1336, Edward complained of the obstinate villainy of some of his Scottish enemies who, it was said, made confederations with foreigners day in and day out. Consequently, inasmuch as the truce was about to expire, Edward attempted to break up the Scottish opposition to him, apparently having little faith in either French or papal efforts for peace. Pursuing his customary policy of preparing for peace and war at the same time, Edward appointed the Earl of Lancaster captain and leader of his army against the Scots in defense of his vassal, Edward Baliol.[29] At the same time, Lancaster was given full powers to receive the submission of those Scots who still held out against Edward, and to issue letters of pardon to them should they surrender.[30]

While Edward was thus trying by diplomacy to win over the Scots, the pope had recalled his envoys,[31] possibly under the delusion that the five months truce would remain unviolated. Philip, on the other hand, continued his offers of assistance in the making of peace between England and Scotland by sending another envoy to England.[32] Edward, still angered by the obstinacy of certain Scots who still continued to oppose him, again attempted to make peace with the Scots independently of French or papal aid, by giving Lancaster power to treat for peace with Andrew Murray, regent in Scotland.[33] However, his efforts unavailing and Scottish perfidy continuing, Edward finally, in June, 1336, invaded Scotland, after making provision for the return of the French envoys to their own country.[34] The pope's efforts for peace at this stage were confined to writing Philip cautioning him to deliberate maturely before taking any further action regarding Scotland.[35]

In July, 1336, negotiations for peace shifted to France, when Edward sent his nuncios there to treat with Philip regarding out-

[29] *Ibid.*, 936 (April 7, 1336).
[30] *Ibid.*, II, 936.
[31] *Ibid.*, 932.
[32] *Ibid.*, 938.
[33] *Ibid.*, 938.
[34] *Ibid.*, 940.
[35] Daumet, No. 184.

standing differences between France and England, in which the Scottish business was included.[36] The English envoys were further empowered to treat directly with David II touching not only a truce, but even concerning peace and final concord.[37] This is the first instance in the whole negotiations when a final peace was the avowed object of the conferences. Nevertheless, war continued. The Scots, possibly hoping for French aid, avoided any general battle. In August, Edward, needing money, saw fit to acquaint his clergy and nobility with the substance of the three-cornered negotiations between England, France, and Scotland. Placing Philip in the rôle of aggressor, Edward recounted how he, anxious for peace, had sent ambassadors to both David and Philip to negotiate for it. Unfortunately, Philip, by helping the Scots against Edward with galleys and many armed men, had made peace impossible. Wherefore, Edward felt justified in defending his realm and the church against the enemy.[38] The king's circular to his clergy and nobility was little more than an appeal for support in the forthcoming war.

By the autumn of 1336, Edward and Philip had become distinctly hostile—in deed if not in word—so that further attempts of Philip to make peace between England and Scotland seem but a part of the hollow friendship assumed by both kings in the critical months immediately preceding the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War. Nevertheless Philip still tried to make peace between the two countries, and in September, 1336, sent once more his nuncios to England to treat with the deputies of Edward and Bruce.[39] Edward, however, after making arrangements for the conference to take place in England, promptly left for Scotland to take charge of the war in person.[40] Throughout the campaign in Scotland, Edward still kept up negotiations for peace with Philip, although at this time he strongly suspected the French of planning an invasion of England.[41] It is difficult to account for the seeming inconsistency of all three parties in thus planning for

[36] Rymer, II, 942.
[37] *Ibid.*, II, 942.
[38] *Ibid.*, II, 944.
[39] *Ibid.*, II, 945 (September 1 and 3, 1336).
[40] Because of the death of the Earl of Cornwall who had been in charge.
[41] Rymer, II, 948, 949.

peace and war at the same time. Neither the English, the French, or the Scots sincerely desired either a long peace or a long war at this time. In spite of all the negotiations, no peace was established, and as Benedict XII had warned, the Anglo-Scottish war merged shortly into an Anglo-French conflict.

The foregoing account has been given in some detail as an example of secular mediation of the time, illustrating as it does both the limitations and dangers of secular interference. In the first place, we find that France was the only secular power interested in promoting peace between England and Scotland. In the second place, France was not an impartial arbiter, since she had selfish interests in the war. Philip had practically admitted as much to the pope by citing the provisions of Franco-Scottish treaties which compelled him to aid the Scots should they be attacked by the English. The truces which were made through French intervention cannot be regarded as contributing to the cause of permanent peace. Probably that cause was damaged by the oft-repeated making and breaking of truces. No attempt was made to remove the underlying causes of war; the truces merely suspended hostilities. Since they tacitly assumed that war would continue, they were used to advantage by the belligerents as a breathing-space in which to make more elaborate preparations for war. Obviously there was need for some agency for peace more disinterested than a secular power in the outcome of war, and more devoted to peace for its own sake. From 1334 to 1342, the papacy to some extent filled this need.

The election of Pope Benedict XII, born Jacques Fournier, took place on December 20th, 1334, shortly after the death of his predecessor, John XXII. Of the twenty-four cardinals assembled for the election, Fournier, cardinal-priest of St. Prisca, was perhaps the least prominent. According to Villani, his elevation to the papacy was an accident. The cardinals were divided into two groups, the smaller of which was led by John Colonna, the larger by Cardinal Talleyrand. It was the larger group, the French faction, which at first offered the tiara to John of Comminges, lately Archbishop of Toulouse. As a condition of their support, however, they required him to promise solemnly not to remove the papacy to Rome. Foreseeing danger to the church

and Christendom in the continued exile of the papacy, the cardinal refused the proposal; whereupon the first ballot was taken merely to test the temper of the college, votes being given to the most unlikely and insignificant member. In this manner, and probably to the genuine surprise and possible chagrin of most of the electors, Jacques Fournier received two-thirds of the electoral votes, the number necessary for election to the papacy in the fourteenth century.[42]

"What have you done, my brethren? You have elected a dolt, an uncouth and unknown man."[43] Thus protested the new pope with the modesty and dismay customary on such occasions. Fournier, generally known as the "White Cardinal" because of the Cistercian habit he invariably wore, adopted the name of Benedict, "and rightly so, for he was blessed in country and town, and possessed the blessing of a firm conscience and complete sincerity."[44] The new pope, a miller's son, was born in Saverdun, in the county of Foix. Despite his declarations, he was neither ignorant nor obscure. He had studied and taught theology at Paris,[45] and served the church both as abbot and bishop.[46] Unlike his predecessor, Benedict XII was impressed more by the responsibilities of his office than by its privileges. As pope, his small fame has rested chiefly on his record as a reformer.[47] His biographers on the whole have dealt with him kindly if not enthusiastically.[48] To the papacy he brought a monastic rigour and personal austerity combined with a keen sense of duty and deep love of justice, qualities more likely to endear him to pos-

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[42] G. Villani, *Istorie Fiorentine*, Milan, 1803, Vol. VII, Cap. 62.

[43] *Ibid.*, Cap. 62.

[44] E. Baluze, *Vitae Paparum Avinonensis* (ed. G. Mollat), i, 219.

[45] He received his bachelor's and doctor's degrees in theology at the University of Paris, and lectured there. In January, 1336, he issued a bull settling the hotly debated question regarding the state of the saints in glory. Raynaldus, 1336, No. 2.

[46] Abbot of Fontfroide (Cistercian), 1311; Bishop of Pamiers, 1317–1325; Bishop of Mirepoix, 1325–26. Baluze, i, 197, 229.

[47] In particular he attacked simony, pluralities, absentees, expectancies, and attempted extensive monastic reform. Raynaldus, 1335, Nos. 64, 67, 65; Baluze, i, 221, 230, 210, 232, 233.

[48] The authors of the first seven *Vitae* commend his justice, modesty, charity, and simplicity. The author of *Octava Vita* regards him as a hypocrite, harsh and greedy. Baluze, i. For a criticism of the latter, see M. Prou, *Les Vies des Papes d'Avignon*, art. in *Journal des Savants*, 1918, 305–306.

terity than to his contemporaries.[49] Unfortunately, the very traits which so admirably suited the monk and reformer tended at times to hamper the diplomat. In the field of international politics Benedict's rigid devotion to justice too often made him inflexible when there was need of compromise. In the monastery there had been one rule; in diplomacy he found there were many. War not only distressed but puzzled him. He had to learn that the problem of peace was the reconciling of opposing rights rather than the righting of a definite wrong.

Benedict XII, in common with many of his predecessors and successors, disapproved of war among Christian peoples. No absolute pacifist was Benedict: he was not willing to give up everything for the sake of peace. Peace, like most things, had its price, and the pope was not the man to ignore its cost. Although peace was an ideal, it was not the only one. Likewise, war was but one evil among many; nor was it the worst. Heresy and paganism were greater evils than war; consequently Benedict advocated war as a means of extirpating them. War was a chastisement fitting for the infidel and heretic. Peace was a gift of God to which only Christians were entitled, by virtue of their creed. As head of Christendom, the pope was disturbed at beholding Christians fighting among themselves. He urged them to live together in peace and harmony not only for their own good, but as an example to those outside the fold.[50]

Benedict advocated peace not only for religious reasons, but also on practical grounds. He deplored the misery caused by war, and doubted the efficacy of battle as a means of solving international disputes. Because of the large element of chance, war proved little or nothing, since "one who was conquered seventeen times, won the eighteenth battle; and another who won two victories was totally defeated in the third engagement."[51] The pope was fond of pointing out the fact that war bankrupts a nation, even a successful war.[52]

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[49] Mollat points out that Benedict has partaken of the fate of all austere reformers, being little loved, and much decried. *Les Papes d'Avignon, 1305–1378*, 65.

[50] Daumet, No. 648; Baluze, i, 221, 230; Raynaldus, 1335, No. 64.

[51] Rymer, II, 1103.

[52] *Ibid.*, II, 1103; Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 582.

Not only personally but officially, Benedict was anxious for peace. As pope, he regarded himself as the only appropriate mediator in disputes between Christian princes and peoples. We have already seen his hearty disapproval of secular mediation, which he regarded as an unwarranted usurpation of a papal function. He felt that by virtue of his position he was better able to impartially survey and to alleviate the conflicts of Christendom than was any secular prince.[53] The papacy at this time, however, was by no means so completely divorced from secular politics as Benedict fondly assumed. In certain cases, as we shall see—notably Italy and Germany—the pope proved to be even more partial in his mediation than was Philip VI in the Anglo-Scottish conflict.

Moreover, in the years just preceding the accession of Benedict, the prestige of the papacy in international affairs had seemed to dwindle. While the popes continued to dwell at Avignon, suspicion grew that they were pro-French. Indeed, the activities of Clement V and John XXII had done little to allay this attitude, and much to further it. When, therefore, Benedict claimed the right of mediation in secular disputes on the grounds of papal impartiality, there were many who doubted his sincerity.[54] The enemies of Philip VI were ever ready to detect in papal policies the pollution of French intrigue. Surrounded as Benedict was by French cardinals, living as he did on the banks of the Rhone, and being frequently visited by Philip VI and his friend Robert of Naples, it is not to be wondered at that he was accused of adopting pro-French policies.[55] Whether this be fact or fancy is still a disputed point.[56] Certain it is, however, that Benedict's efforts

[53] Daumet, No. 644.

[54] Benedict was aware that these suspicions existed, and protested against them. Cal. Pap. Reg., 11, 583. Some of the chroniclers say that the papal legates sent to make peace between England and France favored Philip rather than Edward, and that the Archbishop of Canterbury publicly said so. *Chron. Angliae*, 6; *Ypodigma Neustria*, 276; *Hist. Anglicana*, 222.

[55] The view that Benedict was pro-French is held by Creighton and to some extent by Mollat, *op. cit.*, 88. The former regards the pope as "an upright but feeble-minded monk" weakly succumbing to French influence. *History of the Papacy*, 1, 42.

[56] Daumet points out that since the popes at Avignon did not live in French territory, they were in reality independent and free from French influence in this respect; that the examination of Benedict's acts do not lead one to represent him as enfeoffed without reservations to the policy of Philip of Valois; and that on only one occasion did Philip's influence weigh in a marked form on Benedict. *Op. cit., Introduction*, viii.

for peace were hindered by suspicions of his sincerity.

Not only was the papacy at a disadvantage exiled from Rome, but Rome was in distress bereft of the papacy. Bitterly Petrarch bemoaned the sorrow of Rome, reproaching the papacy for its desertion of the Holy City.[57] Eloquently he besought Benedict to return to Rome, feeling that the mere presence of the pope would somehow restore order and dispel all the evils then besetting the unhappy city.[58] Nor was Benedict himself insensible to the probable injury to both Rome and the papacy in their continued separation. He seems to have had an earnest desire to return to Rome, or at least to Italy. Early in his pontificate when he became dangerously ill, the pope, expecting to die, ordered his remains to be interred in the Vatican.[59] The day after his election, in anticipation of his removal to Rome, he ordered St. Peter's, the Lateran and some other abandoned palaces at Rome to be repaired at the cost of fifty thousand gold florins.[60] The Romans themselves, in sympathy with Benedict's wish to return to them, sent deputies to him in 1335, furnished with cogent arguments in favor of reestablishing the papacy at Rome, "where providence has established the apostolic see and where repose the remains of so many saints."[61] Benedict agreed to their request, but postponed settling the day of his departure until the first of October, 1335.[62] The delay was fatal to the Roman cause. By October the city was plunged into civil war between its leading families, the Colonna and Orsini, a struggle which made it unsafe for the pope to return.

Benedict, however, was reluctant to give up his plan to return to Italy, even if not to Rome. Accordingly, he considered adopting the project favoured by John XXII toward the end of his pontificate, namely to remove to Bologna. John had sent legates there to prepare for the coming of the pope and cardinals, but in March, 1334, one of the factions that divided the city persuaded

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[57] F. Petrarch, *Epistola poetica*, Bk. 1, epist. 2.
[58] *Ibid.*, Bk. 1, epist. 4.
[59] *Ibid.*, Bk. 1, epist. 2.
[60] Baluze, i, 219.
[61] Raynaldus, 1335, No. 3.
[62] Baluze, i, 199. He was at that time awaiting a visit from Philip VI who was making a tour of his country and planned to see the pope on his way home.

the people that the taking of houses and palaces by the legate supposedly in preparation for the pope was really but a ruse to oppress public liberty. As a result, the legate was besieged in his castle and shortly forced to leave Bologna.[63] When Benedict became pope, he announced that he was ready to hold his court at Bologna, providing the populace would honourably receive him. He sent nuncios to the city to declare his intentions. Should they find the citizens well disposed toward the pope, they were to prepare a palace for him and lodgings for the cardinals. Unfortunately, the nuncios found Bologna still divided by the same spirit of revolt which had lately caused the expulsion of John's legate. Returning to Avignon, they told Benedict of the troublous conditions in Bologna, at that time rivalling those in Rome. Whereupon, the pontiff gradually abandoned his idea of returning to Italy, and in 1339 began to build a magnificent palace at Avignon, evidently reconciling himself to the Exile.

The purpose of this chapter has been to briefly sketch some of the conditions surrounding the papacy from 1334 to 1342 which might be expected to influence Benedict XII in his attempts to attain peace for Christendom. There were many wars going on, and no machinery for the making of peace. Secular attempts had not been successful; would papal efforts be more efficient, more impartial? The period was not one in which the prestige of the papacy was great. The absence of the pope from his proper residence—Rome—gave him an appearance of weakness. His presence in a foreign land made his policies suspect. The personal attempts of Benedict to return to Italy were foiled by the disturbances there. The circumstances of his election might help rather than hinder him in some respects. He was a "dark horse," his election an accident, due to chance rather than the conscious support of either the French or Italian group in the College. Thus he was not bound by any pre-election promises. On the other hand he could not count on the support of either party. The fact that he was a Frenchman perhaps inclined him to the French group; but his monastic training removed him to some extent from the worldliness of politics. His education fitted him ad-

[63] Villani, VII, Cap. VI, VII.

mirably for the theological responsibilities of his office. He had had experience in governing two dioceses before he became pope. Such was the man who was to attempt to bring peace to Christendom. He sincerely loved peace, and believed in its worth. How he tried to convince warring Christians of its value is the subject of the next few chapters.

II

The Hundred Years' War (1): Papal Efforts to Prevent It, 1335-1338

The Hundred Years' War was the most extensive and stubborn conflict which broke out during the pontificate of Benedict XII. To at first prevent, and later to stop, this war, the pope made greater and more sustained efforts for peace than in any other case. There were three factors which modified to a greater or less degree the effectiveness and sincerity of papal mediation. In the first place, there was the series of alliances which both England and France sought to make for use against each other. These alliances hampered papal efforts for peace in two respects. They were based on the oaths of the contracting parties. We have already seen Benedict's policy regarding the Franco-Scottish alliance, how he sustained the oath on which the alliance was based, yet deplored the terms of the alliance as inimicable to peace. Another difficulty presented by the alliances was the fact that they often began as economic or commercial pacts, rather than as political treaties. This applied particularly to some of Edward III's earlier agreements with the Netherlanders and Germans. The pope could hardly be expected to intervene in the establishment of staple towns, or in the withdrawal of wool from the market.[1] In cases where the alliances were deliberately concluded as a means of promoting war, Benedict did intervene, as we shall see.

A second factor which affected Benedict's attempts at mediation was the position of Louis of Bavaria. The pope regarded the Emperor as a heretic to be shunned by all Christians until through good faith, good works, and papal charity, he should be once again received into the church. Louis was constantly sending his envoys to Benedict to treat regarding his reconcilia-

[1] H. S. Lucas, *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War, 1326–1347.*

tion with the Holy See,[2] and became more and more extravagant in his expressions of good faith. The pope, however, hated the very odour of heresy and, surrounded by a bevy of French cardinals whose number he increased,[3] bombarded by letters from Philip of France[4] and Robert of Naples,[5] postponed on various pretexts the reconciliation so ardently solicited by the emperor. On the other hand, it cannot be said that Benedict so far imitated his predecessor as to extend his hatred of heresy to the heretic himself, for he refrained throughout his pontificate from confirming the sentences issued against the emperor by John XXII.[6] Nevertheless, Benedict was unalterably opposed to any alliance of a Christian king with Louis of Bavaria, so long as the latter remained a heretic. At different times both Philip and Edward welcomed the prospect of an alliance with the emperor. On both occasions the pope was equally disapproving; and the Anglo-Imperial pact of 1337 evoked from Benedict probably the most violent expressions of condemnation of which he was capable.

The third factor which affected the pope's efforts for peace, chiefly by discrediting them, was the proposed crusade against the Turks and Moors. Benedict advocated the crusade not only because of the threatened inroads of the infidels, but as a means of diverting the attention of Christian princes from their private quarrels. Unfortunately, this policy had far-reaching consequences inimicable to papal attempts for peace. The crusade which Benedict advocated had been planned by his predecessor shortly before his death. Philip VI, having convinced John XXII of his pious zeal, was named head of the expedition. To finance the crusade, a six-year tenth was to be levied on all ecclesiastical goods, except those of the military orders.[7] On his

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[2] Louis' relations with Benedict are discussed in full by C. Müller, *Der Kampf Ludwigs des Bayern mit der romischen Kurie*, II; Raynaldus, 1335, Nos. 1, 2, 7; 1336, Nos. 17–28; Baluze, i, 198.

[3] Benedict created six cardinals in 1336 of whom five were Frenchmen. Baluze, i, 197.

[4] Philip VI supported Henry of Bavaria for Emperor; he also feared Louis might appropriate certain frontier towns on the outskirts of his kingdom. M. Leroux, *Recherches sur les relations politiques de la France avec l'Allemagne, 189, 199.*

[5] Robert opposed Louis on account of Louis' recent Italian expedition.

[6] F. Rocquain, *Le Cour de Rome*, II, 446.

[7] Baluze, i, 175.

accession Benedict enthusiastically approved of the project, and during the first year of his pontificate, busied himself with the preaching, planning, and financing of the undertaking. Less than a month after his election, he wrote to the bishops of the Christian world, ordering them to enforce John XXII's edict regarding the levying and collecting of the tenths.[8] Philip VI was constantly reminded of his oath to go on a crusade by August 1, 1336,[9] and at the same time the pope urged various princes and people to go and do likewise.[10] Special graces and indulgences were offered to those who would take up the cross, and the pope himself contributed to the outfitting of four galleys of the Christian fleet[11] which was to leave for the Holy Land on May 1, 1335, on a preliminary expedition.

With these preparations in full swing,[12] suddenly the pope himself, to the surprise of many and the suspicion of some, called off the project. In March, 1336, six months before the date set for Philip's departure, Benedict absolved the French king from his oath to lead the proposed crusade. The pope's reasons for so doing are interesting. "Is it not apparent in fact that England and Scotland are in conflict, Germany upset, Tuscany and Lombardy, Apulia and Sicily in full anarchy?" he wrote Philip. Christendom would be but rash to run the risk of a crusade at such a time. In France latent hatreds were already at work against Philip which would break forth unchecked should the king leave his realm. Even should he persist in going to the Holy Land in spite of the discords among Christians, he would be defeated; and defeat would dishonor him before the infidel, and bring shame upon Christendom.[13] The pope apparently felt it more important at this time for Philip to remain at home and preserve order than to seek conflict abroad.

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[8] Daumet, 19 (January 31, 1335).

[9] *Ibid.*, 109, especially after Benedict heard from the Armenian ambassador a vivid account of the recent massacre. The pope sent this envoy to both Philip and Edward to plead in person on behalf of the Armenians and tell the two kings of their plight.

[10] Daumet, 28.

[11] *Ibid.*, 40.

[12] In June, 1335, Benedict formally ratified John XXII's bull establishing the tenths for the crusade, and gave a detailed plan for their collection. Daumet, 66.

[13] Raynaldus, 1336, Nos. 43–45.

Unfortunately for the cause of peace, Benedict found it easier to countermand the crusade than to stop the levying and collection of the tenths to finance it. Various princes who were short of funds for the waging of their private wars were reluctant to restore the ecclesiastical tenths already collected. On various occasions, Philip asked the pope to permit him to retain the tenths already collected or spent, to continue the levy of them in France, or to borrow on them. All these requests Benedict indignantly refused. Nevertheless, his attempts to stop the Anglo-French war were probably weakened by Edward's suspicion that the pope was aiding Philip to finance a secular war with money originally raised for the holy war.

Although the crusade was now abandoned by Benedict, it still played a part in diplomacy. Edward sent special envoys to Philip to treat with him concerning their proposed joint expedition to the Holy Land.[14] Probably the English king wanted to avoid the outbreak of an Anglo-French war which seemed particularly imminent at this time. To the strained relations between the two kings which already existed on account of Scotland was now added their quarrel over Aquitaine. Neither king was as yet fully prepared for war. Whereupon, during the summer and autumn of 1336, conferences took place at Avignon between the pope and the envoys of Edward, Paul de Montefiore and Laurence Falstolf, and those of Philip, Guy Capurius and Peter de Verberia. While these discussions were being carried on under the solicitous eye of the pope, other French and English representatives were treating with each other regarding the outstanding disputes between the two kings.[15] Thus there were two sets of conferences, one at Avignon, one in France.

Preparations for war, however, continued in spite of conferences for peace. Edward ordered his seneschal in Gascony to forbid armed men to leave the duchy without special permission.[16] Philip on his side continued to aid the Scots against Edward. Both kings were busily casting about for new alliances. Edward suspected the king of Norway, the Count of Hainault, Holland,

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[14] Rymer, II, 941–942.
[15] *Ibid.*, II, 941–942; 945.
[16] *Ibid.*, 914.

and Zealand, the lord of Frisia, and the Count of Gueldres of aiding Philip in his support of the Scots.[17] The king of England was particularly upset by rumours that these lords were aiding the king of France, since the former was anxious to secure their help for his own side. A second blow to Edward's cause occurred when Louis of Flanders, Philip's vassal, was persuaded to order the seizure of English merchants in Flanders. As before described, Edward reciprocated, but, anxious not to permanently alienate the Flemings, reminded Count Louis of the friendship which customarily existed between the two peoples, asking him to reconsider his decision.[18]

In November, 1336, Benedict sent Philip de Cambarlhaco, canon of St. Peter's,[19] to Edward asking him to send envoys to Avignon empowered to make a treaty of peace. As a first step toward restoring more amicable relations with Philip, Edward was enjoined to remove Robert of Artois from his court. Philip's messengers who conferred with Benedict during the summer of 1336 had apparently held forth at some length on the subject of Robert, for Benedict now advised Edward that Philip could not treat with him so long as he should entertain and take counsel with Robert, a capital enemy and conspirator against Philip and the Duke of Normandy. The pope appealed to Edward's common sense, pointing out the dangers of entertaining foreigners which might arouse the envy and jealousy of the English barons. The pope had gathered the impression from Philip's envoys that Edward was personally attached to Robert. Benedict, believing Edward to be deluded on the subject, instructed Philip de Cambarlhaco to give the king some details on the subject of Robert's misdeeds. Should Edward persist in his friendship for Robert in spite of the papal envoy's declarations, the pope —as he often did —shifting his argument from the particular to the general, warned Edward that the peace of his realm ought to be dearer to him than the presence of Robert.[20]

At the same time Benedict wrote Philip whose envoys had ex-

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[17] *Ibid.*, 949, 950.
[18] *Ibid.*, 948.
[19] Fierens, No. 349.
[20] Daumet, No. 242.

plained to the pope the French version of the current Anglo-French differences, particularly in regard to Robert of Artois. Philip of Cambarlhaco, whom Benedict was sending to Edward, was instructed to stop to see the king of France on his way to England. If the two kings could possibly agree, the pope would wish them to send their representatives to Avignon to hold another conference in the presence of the pope. This time however, Benedict asked the kings to furnish their envoys with sufficient power to make a treaty of peace.[21]

The year 1336 thus drew to a close with discord still brewing and prospects for peace receding. In December, Edward ordered measures to be taken for the defense of the realm of England,[22] and a few weeks later ordered the same for the defense of Gascony.[23] These actions were decided upon as a result of the piratical activities of French merchants in the Channel, the rumour of a possible French invasion of England, and the fact of French depredations in Aquitaine. Edward was by now fully convinced that Philip was intent on ruining him and appropriating the entire duchy.[24] His fears were justified on May 24, 1337, when Philip, by virtue of his overlordship, confiscated the duchy of Guienne.[25]

Since these measures presumed the certainty of war, both kings renewed their solicitations for foreign aid. Edward sought help from the Low Countries and Germany[26] while Philip insolently asked the pope for ecclesiastical tenths. The king of France wished permission to use the tenths collected for the crusade, or at least 400,000 livres of them. Benedict, shocked at the request, wrote Philip reminding him of his oath that never under any pretext should the funds raised to combat the infidel be diverted elsewhere, and should this happen the sums so diverted should be immediately paid back. The pope foresaw the criticism that would be levelled at him should he countenance such misuse of ecclesiastical revenue. To use this money to spill Christian blood would

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[21] Daumet, No. 238.
[22] Rymer, II, 956.
[23] *Ibid.*, II, 957 (January 15, 1337).
[24] *Ibid.*, II, 957.
[25] *Grandes Chroniques* (ed. Luce), V, 367.
[26] *Grandes Chroniques*, V, 367.

gravely offend God who would terribly chastise His Vicar for permitting such a sacrilege. Should the pope once permit it, the future levying of new subsidies for a crusade would be rendered impossible. From a practical point of view, the pope pointed out to Philip, he and his heirs would never be able to repay the mounting loan.[27]

It is interesting to note at this stage that the relations between France and the papacy were strained. Several factors besides Benedict's refusal of Philip's request for the tenths may account for the estrangement. The king of France who had earlier opposed the reconciliation of Louis of Bavaria with the Holy See now pressed Benedict to accept the emperor's protestations of good faith. The reason for this change of heart was that Philip and Louis desired to form an alliance. Philip would need help against England, and Louis, allied with the king of France, would, he thought, be thus in a better position to receive favours from the pope. Benedict, however, was not to be hurried, especially in matters where heresy was concerned. He pointed out to Philip that the question of Louis' reconciliation concerned not only the king of France, but also Robert of Sicily, who had suffered greatly from Louis' former activities in Italy. Nevertheless, the pope would be glad to receive envoys from all parties concerned; and the negotiations should take place at Avignon.[28]

Philip was angered by Benedict's prudence, disappointed in his refusal of the tenths, and altogether weary of papal intervention. He told the papal envoy, Philip of Cambarlhaco, that the pope was not acting in the interests of the king of France. Benedict, informed of Philip's accusations, was astonished and grieved, protesting that he had ever had a truly paternal affection and solicitude for France. Nor could he understand Philip's charge that papal intervention in the current disputes was an attack on the French crown.[29] The pope insisted that his conscience was clear, that he had acted in the interest of all, and not in any way against the special interest of France.[30] In view of the charge

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[27] Daumet, No. 280 (April 4, 1337).
[28] *Ibid.*, No. 263.
[29] *Ibid.*, No. 264.
[30] *Ibid.*, No. 264.

usually made that the Avignonese popes were pro-French, these declarations of both Philip and Benedict are particularly interesting. The pope was obviously trying to steer a middle course—in regard to Louis' reconciliation, in regard to the tenths, in regard to the Anglo-French disputes. Benedict instructed his nuncio to have one more interview with the king of France in order to convince him if possible of the pope's lotty and impartial motives. When, however, Philip's assurances were not forthcoming, Benedict ordered his envoy to return with all speed to Avignon.[31]

In June, 1337, the pope tried another method of approach. Instructing the Archbishops of Rouen and Sens to try to dispose Philip and Edward to peace, he ordered them to find out particularly if Philip would accept papal mediation in case of war with England.[32] The king, however, still angry with Benedict, was not likely to accept his offer. The month before, he had turned a cold shoulder to the attempts of his sister, the Countess of Hainault, to dissuade him from war.[33] The archbishops, perceiving Philip's temper, advised the pope to send immediately two nuncios with extensive power to mediate between England and France[34], rather than to insist on any conference to be held at Avignon. Pending the arrival of the two new envoys, Benedict ordered the archbishops to obtain if possible a postponement of the declaration of war.[35] Fearing, however, the outbreak of war before his ambassadors could reach the two kings, the pope sent ahead his chaplain, Peter of Burgundy, in order to keep him informed of events, especially of any opening for papal mediation that might present iself.[36]

So great, however, were Philip's suspicions of Benedict's efforts for peace, that it was hardly likely that he could be induced to accept papal arbitration. Adding fuel to the flame of the king's distrust of the pope were two rumours which had reached Philip's ear. The first was that an English bishop had been seen somewhere in Lorraine bearing to Edward secret pontifical

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[31] *Ibid.*, No. 270.
[32] *Ibid.*, No. 342.
[33] *Chronographia*, II, 33.
[34] Daumet, No. 335.
[35] *Ibid.*, No. 335.
[36] *Ibid.*, No. 336.

letters in which Benedict absolved the Counts of Juliers and Gueldres from their oaths of fealty to Philip. The French envoys at Avignon, Stephen Aubert and Peter André,[37] related their master's suspicions to the pope. The latter roundly branded these rumours as false, pointing out that had he planned to intervene in the affairs of Juliers or Gueldres he would not have failed to consult or inform the king of France. Neither count had asked to be released from his oath; had either done so, Philip would have been straightway informed of it. Possibly the English bishop forged the papal letters although the pope doubted it, since it could easily be proved by examining the registers of the papal chancery where were deposited copies of all papal letters. In general, the pope treated this whole affair as ridiculous, warning Philip, however, to beware of evil tongues and shut his ears to those who should presume to suggest false and mendacious rumours.[37]

The second report which reached Philip's ears causing him to suspect the honesty of the pope's motives in mediating between England and France was that Benedict favoured an Anglo-Imperial alliance. The French king's distrust is easily understandable if one remembers that only a few months previously the pope had condemned a proposed Franco-Imperial alliance. Benedict, grieved at Philip's suspicions, promptly wrote him that it was true that Edward had applied to him for a license to conclude an alliance with Louis of Bavaria and had sent his envoy, Paul de Montefiore, to solicit it in person. Philip was assured, however, that the pope had refused to issue any such license, since Benedict was condemning the project as strongly as he had formerly opposed a Franco-Imperial alliance.[38]

While the French king feared an alliance between England and the Empire, the pope deplored it. Philip was afraid for the safety of his realm; Benedict was afraid for the peace of Christendom. He begged Edward to consider the stain which such a treaty would bring upon the king's glory and honour[39]. In great detail he reviewed for Edward's benefit the full extent of Louis' heresy—

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[37] *Ibid.*, No. 343.
[38] *Ibid.*, No. 341.
[39] Cal. Pap. Reg., 564.

his usurpation of the imperial throne, his defiance of papal rights to confirm German elections, his support of the antipope Peter deCorbaria, his unwarranted invasion of Italy. As usual the pope based his arguments on practical as well as religious grounds: he reminded the king that the Germans had the reputation for being unsteady allies at best, as Edward I had learned to his cost. For these reasons, the pope absolutely refused to grant the king a license to make a confederation with Louis. At the same time he wrote the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishops of Lincoln and Winchester, and the Earl of Salisbury, asking them to add their persuasions to the pope's prayers and exhortations against the alliance.[40] Nor did Benedict neglect to warn Louis that by taking part in a war which the Holy See desired so ardently to prevent, Louis would but increase the difficulties in the way of his own reconciliation with the Church.[41]

Notwithstanding the pope's protests to both Edward and Louis, the long-awaited and long-dreaded Anglo-Imperial alliance took place. (August 27, 1337.) Edward wrote Louis a long letter dripping with affection and pity for the latter's misfortunes, and offering to put all his forces in the service of the Empire against Philip. Never would the king of England sign any peace, truce, or alliance with the enemies of Louis.[42] Here was a provision which bade fair to defeat papal efforts to prevent war between England and France.

Undaunted though worried, Benedict swiftly dispatched two nuncios, Peter, cardinal of St. Praxed's, and Bertrand, cardinal of St. Mary's in Aquiro, who for the next three years laboured unceasingly in the interests of peace between the two realms. They were furnished with extensive powers to do whatever might promote peace. They were instructed to dissolve all pacts and confederations initiated by the two kings or others through which it were possible to nourish discord.[43] In view of Edward's recent promise to Louis of Bavaria not to make peace with the latter's enemies, the powers given the cardinal nuncios to dissolve such

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[40] *Ibid.*, 564.
[41] Raynaldus, 1337, Nos. 3, 4.
[42] Rymer, II, 991.
[43] Daumet, No. 305.

pacts assume a new significance. The legates were further empowered to use ecclesiastical censures against those who should hinder their mission. On due satisfaction being made, the penalties might be relaxed. Any clergyman who should preach, say, or do anything unfriendly to the attainment of peace might lose his benefice, at the discretion of the legates. All persons—lay or clerical—were forbidden to invade France or England.[44]

Besides sending special ambassadors with extraordinary powers to further peace, Benedict made use of the local clergy who were instructed to assist the nuncios in their mission. The pope wrote separately to both the prelates and magnates of the two kingdoms enjoining them to receive the cardinals and assist them in their efforts. In accordance with the custom of the time, the papal legates were to be maintained at the cost of the clergy of the country to which they were sent.[45]

The cardinals found Edward and Philip little disposed to peace at this time. Philip's officials were compelling prelates to contribute a subsidy for the war, an action which particularly grieved the pope. Unwilling, however, to widen the breach between France and the papacy by accusing the French king outright of complicity in the action of his officials, Benedict diplomatically assumed, for Philip's benefit, that it was being done without the knowledge of the king. He did instruct his ambassadors, however, to inform Philip that to levy military subsidies on the clergy was in derogation of ecclesiastical liberty, and could not be permitted.[46]

Meanwhile, Edward struck a blow to papal hopes for peace by proclaiming himself the legitimate successor to the kingdom of France. Out of solicitude for that kingdom, Edward appointed the Duke of Brabant, Marquis of Juliers, Count of Hainault, and Earl of Northampton as his ambassadors at large to make it known to all and sundry that the realm of France by right belonged to the king of England. They were empowered to do

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[44] *Ibid.*, No. 307–334.
[45] *Ibid.*, No. 310.
[46] *Ibid.*, No. 366.

everything possible to take possession of France in Edward's name.[47]

In spite of these hostile manifestations of both kings, war remained undeclared, and fighting was held back by mutual agreement or rather by mutual self-interest. It was probably Edward's financial need which induced him to refrain from war at this time.[48] On September 24, 1337, he went so far as to order his officials who had been assembling troops to dismiss them.[49] Philip likewise assured the papal legates that he was ready to make peace, and ordered his men in Gascony to cease from October third to Christmas from carrying out his order regarding the subjugation of Aquitaine, and the attack on England. The king promised that this arrangement would hold unless Edward should invade either France or Scotland. The pope, rejoicing at the good news, urged his envoys to continue their efforts.[50] He felt apparently that the suspension of hostilities was in some degree due to the efforts of the cardinal nuncios, for he thanked Philip for his "acquiescence in their counsels regarding peace."[51]

Benedict, however, had too often witnessed the breaking of truces to be deceived into thinking that by the postponement of hostilities war was averted. Although Edward, like Philip, appeared to be at this time favourably disposed toward peace,[52] the pope feared that England's allies would insist on war. In order to dissuade the king from meeting his allies on the continent, Benedict instructed his nuncios to go to England to meet Edward before he should leave his realm, rather than await his coming to France. Once the king should cross the Channel, the pope felt he would be unlikely to return, since his allies—particularly the Germans "who want his pay"—would incite him to war.[53]

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[47] Rymer, II, 1000, 1001.

[48] "The real reason for the change in the royal plans was the failure of the merchants to collect the wool as had been contracted for in London on July 27."—Lucas, *op. cit.*, 237.

[49] Rymer, II, 997.

[50] Daumet, No. 368.

[51] *Ibid.*, No. 369.

[52] Edward sent envoys to Philip empowered to settle all causes of the quarrel between them. Rymer, II, 1002; he had also accorded a gracious reception to the papal legates. *Ibid.*, 1002; *Chronographia*, II, 56.

[53] Daumet, No. 370.

The king of England, however, did not need the persuasions of his allies to open hostilities; on the contrary, he was of the opinion that he already had numerous justifications for going to war. These he explained to Benedict, protesting that his personal desires for peace were being constantly thwarted by the manifest ill-will of Philip toward him. For the first time he called the pope's attention to Philip's illegal usurpation of the French throne and territory which Edward claimed. Until these should be restored to their rightful owner, peace would be impossible. The king further complained that Philip had subsidised Scottish rebels, aiding them with ships outfitted under the pretext of an expedition to the Holy Land. This was a thinly veiled accusation against the pope who, Edward believed, had countenanced the French king's diversion of money raised for a crusade to secular warfare. Edward described how Philip had permitted raids on English shores by many pirates and armed men; how in the Duchy of Aquitaine many crimes and burnings had taken place. Until these various wrongs should be undone, Edward could not hearken favourably to the pleas of the papal legates. Referring to the pope's condemnation of the Anglo-Imperial alliance, the king informed Benedict that Louis was a man of God, who already had humbly and devoutly submitted himself to the Holy See.[54]

The pope replied to Edward's letter at length, if not adequately. Ignoring for the time the king's claim to the French throne, the pope suggested that peace and union between England and France would be of more advantage to the two countries and Christendom itself than the present discord which might indeed afford a chance for the Teutonic confederation, headed by the heretical Louis, to quietly cross the Rhine and appropriate some of the territory now in dispute between Edward and Philip. As a preliminary step toward this peace and union, the pope suggested that the two kings should come to some agreement regarding Aquitaine.[55] Benedict's answer to Edward's charge that he had allowed Philip to use money collected under the pretext of a

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[54] Rymer, II, 1004.
[55] Daumet, No. 375.

crusade to outfit ships to be used against England was a flat denial. As we have already seen, the pope refused outright all Philip's requests to divert to secular uses any of the money collected for the Crusade. On the other hand, some of these tenths had already been collected in France, as the cardinal nuncios had complained to the pope. Benedict had not wished to further estrange the relations between France and the papacy by ordering the French clergy to refuse to contribute subsidies for the war, although he had pointed out to Philip that it was done in derogation of ecclesiastical liberty. Upon receiving Edward's complaint, however, the pope promptly wrote to the Archbishop of Rouen insisting that, should peace be established between England and France, there should be presented a detailed account of the collection and spending of the tenths collected for the crusade.[56] This reply of the pope indicates that the papacy was too weak to force the restitution of the money, even though Benedict had opposed Philip's use of it. The order to the French archbishop was a weak evasion of the question, for it implied that so long as there was war, there need be no accounting for the tenths. It is small wonder that Edward from this time forth suspected the pope of French leanings. It is only fair to Benedict, however, to again point out that one of his original instructions to the cardinal nuncios was that they should induce Philip to refrain from requiring the French clergy to subsidise the war. As a matter of fact, the legates had found that this part of their labours was so difficult and took up so much of their time that, fearing that their general mission to make peace might suffer from neglect, they had committed to the Archbishops of Rouen and Sens the part of their task which was now causing Edward to be suspicious of the pope's sincerity. Benedict, realizing the difficulty of inducing Philip to refrain from forcing the clergy to contribute to the war, congratulated his nuncios on their foresight in delegating this part of their labours to the two French archbishops whose persuasions might have more weight with Philip.[57]

While Benedict ordered his nuncios to hasten to England to try

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[56] Daumet, No. 378.
[57] *Ibid.*, 372, 389.

to prevent Edward from crossing the Channel, he meanwhile wrote to Philip urging him for his own sake to make peace with England, and even an alliance. In order to persuade Philip of the advantages of, and even the necessity for, such an alliance, the pope described at some length the recently formed Teutonic League, in whose very existence Benedict saw danger to France. For the confederation included almost all the secular princes of Germany, except the king of Bohemia, and was amply supported by a large deposit of money. The league had two objects: the ruin of France, and the election of Edward as king of the Romans should Louis of Bavaria resign. Members of the league were closely bound to it by a series of oaths. Should any member give aid to France, the others would seize his land; should anyone withdraw from the confederation, the others would destroy his goods. Even though the pope himself should dissolve the league and dispense the members from their oaths, still the confederates would be bound by their promises and temporal penalties. Peace could not be made with France unless each and all consented to it. Pending the resignation of Louis of Bavaria, Edward was to be made vicar for life in lower Germany "so as to be nearer to France, and so better able to attack it." The very existence of the Teutonic League made Benedict fear for the cause of peace. In order to defeat the object of the confederation he advocated an alliance between England and France, for he shrewdly suspected, and rightly so, that it was English gold that cemented the league. Could England be weaned away from the Germans by an alliance with France, the Teutonic confederation might collapse, which Benedict heartily desired. The pope clearly saw, however, that no Anglo-French alliance would be possible unless the two countries put an ened to their dispute over Aquitaine which he earnestly urged both Philip and Edward to do.[58]

It was at this time that Benedict who so far had opposed all war now shifted his policy, and advised Philip to prepared for a defensive war.[59] Undoubtedly he thereby weakened his position

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[58] Daumet, No. 374.
[59] *Ibid.*, 374.

as mediator since he admitted the justification of defensive warfare, an excuse for conflict only too likely to be adopted by Christian belligerents. It must be admitted, however, that the pope's change in policy was directly due to the threat of a Teutonic invasion of France. Since the Germans were led by Louis of Bavaria, a heretic, Benedict could and did plead the excuse of a holy war. Thus his program at the end of 1337 included making peace between England and France by breaking up the Anglo-Imperial alliance, and settling the differencesb etween Edward and Philip in Aquitaine. Secondly, he planned that, should the first part of his program succeed, France should engage in a defensive war to repulse the Teuton and heretical invaders of the kingdom.

In November 1337, Benedict was gladdened by the apparent prospect of success in the first part of his program. Edward prepared to receive most graciously the cardinal nuncios who, as we have seen, hastened to England to prevent the king, if possible, from crossing the Channel to join his allies. The Bishop of Lincoln, the Earls of Suffolk and Northumberland, and John Darcy, steward, were appointed to discuss the matter of peace with the papal legates.[60] The constable of Dover was to receive the visitors cordially, to let no one injure them and punish those who did; nor let the cardinals be in want.[61] It will be remembered that Philip and Edward had agreed to a truce until Christmas, 1337. The latter now informed the papal nuncios that out of reverence for the Apostolic See the invasion of France would be postponed. He had carefully considered the apostolic letters brought to him by the cardinals in which the pope exhorted him to make peace with "our relative of France," the peace begun through papal mediation. Commending the perfect zeal of Benedict and the cooperation of his nuncios, Edward wrote the pope that as Parliament was to meet on February 2, 1338, he would at that time consider what should be done regarding France. In the meantime, out of reverence for the pope, he promised not to invade

[60] Rymer, II, 1002.

[61] Rymer, II, 1002. Far from being in want, the cardinals were regarded as an expensive luxury, a fact lamented by some of the chroniclers, Knighton, II, 2.

France until March 1, 1338, nor even then without giving notice. He gave orders to this effect to the steward of Gascony, the warden of the Cinque Ports, bailiffs and men of other places.[62]

When Parliament met in February, however, the king insisted upon the rightness of his cause against Philip,[63] and began to make preparations to vindicate it by arms. Nevertheless on February 24 at the request of the papal legates he prolonged the armistice from March 1 to June 24, 1338.[64] Both Philip and Edward used the period of the truce to prepare more fully for war; neither respected the armistice.[65] Finally on May 6, the king of England formally revoked his promise to the papal nuncios not to invade France.[66] This was equivalent to a declaration that now he would invade that country; the war would begin. Pursuing, however, his old policy of peace and war at the same time, Edward sent envoys to Philip to treat of peace.[67] With them left the cardinal nuncios[68] who, having failed to dissuade the king from crossing the Channel, now prepared to carry on their labours at the scene of the proposed conflict.[69] After delaying his departure successively for various reasons,[70] the king finally left England on June 12, 1338,[71] meanwhile ordering the clergy of his realm to say prayers for his success in the forthcoming war.[72]

Upon his arrival in Antwerp in July, 1338, Edward proceeded to hold lengthy interviews with his flock of allies,[73] and almost im-

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[62] Rymer, II, 1007.

[63] Knighton, *Chronicle*, II, 3; according to Le Baker, Edward told the papal nuncios that he was quite willing to make peace, but that Philip refused to recognize his rights to the French throne; had treated the English as Jews—enemies of Christ; and had deprived him unjustly of Guienne and Ponthieu. *Chron.*, 160.

[64] Rymer, II, 1014 (February 24, 1338).

[65] E. Déprez, *Les Préliminaires de la Guerre de Cent Ans*, 181–182.

[66] Rymer, II, 1034.

[67] *Ibid.*, II, 1043–1044. The Archbishop of Canterbury, the Earl of Suffolk and others, with whom were associated the Duke of Brabant, Counts of Hainault and Gueldres, and the Marquis of Juliers.

[68] Rymer, II, 1033. Edward presented the cardinals with 80 sacks of wool on their departure. *Ibid.*, II, 1038.

[69] Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 567; Murimuth, 83.

[70] Rymer, II, 1027.

[71] *Ibid.*, II, 1050.

[72] *Ibid.*, II, 1025.

[73] Le Baker, 1, 61, 62; Jean le Bel, 1, 136; Murimuth, 84; *Chronographia*, II, 60.

mediately revoked his previous commission to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Durham to make peace with Philip.[74] Proceeding in splendour to Coblentz, he there received from Louis of Bavaria the title of Imperial Vicar,[75] and the promised support of the Teutonic League.[76] As the pope had feared, once Edward left England, the cause of peace became definitely imperilled. Nevertheless, Benedict did not give up hope but wrote identical letters to both Philip and Edward urging them to put an end to the contest between them which would undoubtedly cause the loss of souls, the destruction of bodies, devastation and other horrors. Consequently he asked them to choose envoys to treat with one another in order to arrange a peace.[77] Meanwhile he instructed the cardinals to continue their mission with prudence and diligence and to keep the pope informed of their progress, if any.[78] Feeling that they had perhaps become side-tracked by dealing with the question of Robert of Artois, Benedict now ordered them not to go too deeply into this odious and dangerous business,[79] but rather to concentrate on preventing the actual outbreak of war.

At this point, perhaps some criticism may be made of Benedict's efforts to prevent war from breaking out between England and France. They were not successful. Nor did they fail completely. Through the mediation of the papal legates several truces were made which lasted from October, 1337, to May, 1338 when Edward revoked his promise to the cardinals. One cannot say that it was solely due to papal mediation that these truces were made. Philip and Edward were not yet ready to begin their war so, making a virtue of necessity, protested they were persuaded to peace by their own inclinations and papal persuasions.

It is difficult to ascertain just how the pope regarded these truces. He ordered his cardinals, however, to cease their negotiations so long as the armistice continued. This action seems to

[74] Rymer, II, 1051.
[75] *Chronographia*, II, 65–66.
[76] Knighton, II, 5–6.
[77] Daumet, No. 470.
[78] *Ibid.*, No. 472.
[79] *Ibid.*, No. 473.

have been a blunder. The pope might well have used the respite granted by truces to urge a permanent peace. While the kings used the period to prepare for war, the cardinals might have used it to prepare for peace. I think, however, that the pope was too easily deluded at times into thinking that the postponement of hostilities meant the prevention of war.

On the other hand, Benedict fully understood that the Anglo-French dispute was rooted in the struggle for the possession of Aquitaine, and until the kings settled their differences there, no lasting peace would be possible. By 1338, however, it was clear that Edward and Philip preferred war to arbitration as a means of settling the dispute. In the following chapter we shall see how Benedict tried to change their minds, and substitute arbitration for war.

III

The Hundred Years' War (2): Papal Efforts to Check It, 1338–1339

The efforts made by Benedict from July, 1338, to the end of 1339 to check the outbreak of actual warfare between France and England were intimately affected by his bitter opposition to the Anglo-Imperial alliance. No other treaty made by either Philip or Edward evoked such vehement disapproval from the pope. He tried desperately to detach the English king from an alliance with the heretical Louis, whose policies the pope now unfailingly opposed. The result was that papal efforts for peace became subordinated to papal condemnation of heresy. This gave a new turn to Benedict's policy: he began to show some partiality toward France. Contrary, however, to Edward's charge, the pope did not necessarily become anti-English. He was and continued to be anti-German so long as Louis of Bavaria remained a heretic, which he did until his death. The pope as head of Christendom would more naturally support a Christian king than a heretical impostor in case of a war between the two. Therefore, in view of the contemplated German invasion of France, Benedict supported Philip. To Edward's charge of partiality, the pope now invariably gave as an excuse England's alliance with the Empire.

In order to be able to devote his own efforts exclusively to breaking up the Anglo-Imperial treaty, Benedict left the details of mediation between England and France to his legates, the two cardinals, Peter and Bertrand. These envoys had met those of Edward in the presence of Philip and, on petition of the English ambassadors, the king of France admitted to the conference the Duke of Brabant, the Counts of Hainault and Gueldres, and the Marquis of Juliers. These representatives and those of Philip,[1] together with the papal nuncios, were to meet at Arras to confer

[1] The Archbishop of Rouen, Bishops of Langres, Beauvais, and Tournai.

regarding peace. The pope, pleased at the prospect, warned the cardinals to be discreet, to take care that their labour should not be in vain, and to be diligent and vigilant in prosecuting it.

Meanwhile Benedict now (November 13, 1338) proceeded to write to Edward condemning the Anglo-Imperial alliance and the king's acceptance of the title of Imperial Vicar. The bull contained a short history of the detestable heresies and horrors of Louis of Bavaria and all his works. After rehearsing the emperor's various humble attempts at reconciliation with the papacy, the pope went on to condemn Louis' title as illegal, and consequently any title he might presume to confer on others. Should Louis' allies persist in adhering to him, they would be liable to the same censures Louis was under. For Benedict denied that the Bavarian was either king or emperor, and asserted the full right of the pope to make such a declaration. Could not Edward see that by accepting an illegal title from a heretic, he himself risked excommunication? Benedict charitably assumed that the English king did not fully realize the awful consequences attendant on his perilous alliance with Louis. Since, however, to sin is human and in sin the devil specializes, Benedict preferred to think that Edward had been seduced by the serpent into deception which endangered his soul, and that, please God, his feet would soon be set upon the right path of penitence. Finally, Benedict begged the king to observe that he was offering him a chance to withdraw from his present predicament by repudiating his alliance with Louis. The pope was anxious to be as lenient as God would permit. On the other hand he reminded Edward that "our office demands apostolic severity for persistent offenders just as it demands that we give them an opportunity for remedying their offenses."[2]

After thus giving the English king fair warning, Benedict the next day prohibited all vassals or subjects of the empire from obeying Edward in his so-called capacity of Imperial Vicar, and wrote the bishops of lower Germany to that effect.[3] The papal theory for this action was that during a vacancy in the empire,

[2] Rymer, II, 1063–1065.
[3] Raynaldus, 1338, Nos. 69, 71.

the imperial administration belonged to the Church; that, since Louis was no emperor, nothing he had done, could do, or might do, had the slightest validity.[4]

It was about this time that Benedict began to show the partiality toward Philip of which Edward complained. He warned the French king of the Anglo-Imperial agreement made at Coblentz, and also of the rumour that the Germans had offered Edward a large military subsidy which, however, was to be postponed until May, 1339, since from the German side of the Franco-German frontier Edward would have at any time and as often as he pleased within eight days a force of 6,000 troops, equipped at their own expense and costing him nothing until they should become a part of his army. The pope admitted that this news might not be true, but took occasion to warn Philip to be cautious, since his enemies might be pretending these delays in order to put him off his guard.[5]

Benedict indeed seems to have been horrified at the very prospect of a German invasion of France. Therefore, at the same time that he cautioned Philip to take defensive measures against the Teutonic League, he authorized him to levy a tenth for two years on all ecclesiastical goods in France. Edward thereupon was incensed; he accused the pope of giving a vast sum of money to Philip to be used against England. Benedict, while admitting the grant of a tenth to the French king, carefully pointed out that this tenth was not the same as had been formerly raised for the crusade, but a special levy wherewith Philip might better repulse the invaders of his realm, specifically Louis of Bavaria and his German adherents. Furthermore, the pope asserted it to be within papal power to grant ecclesiastical funds to be used in defending a Christian kingdom from invading heretics. Edward, therefore, would be well advised—for his own sake—to forego his alliance with heretics.[6]

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[4] Rymer, II, 1063.

[5] Daumet, No. 503.

[6] Rymer, II, 1063. Throughout 1338 Benedict continued to insist on the restitution of all the tenths collected for the crusade. In September he wrote the Archbishops of Rouen and Sens, the Bishops of Bayeux and Tournai, ordering them to pronounce ecclesiastical censure against all those guilty of withholding any part of these funds regardless of their rank or apostolic privileges. Daumet, 499.

While the pope continued his attempts to break up the Anglo-Imperial alliance, the cardinal nuncios pursued their mission of peace. At their request Edward appointed the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishops of Durham and Lincoln and three others as his ambassadors to treat for peace with France.[7] However, the king expressly forbade them to treat with Philip as though he were king of France.[8] This was not the first time Edward had raised this question, but apparently Benedict decided to ignore it. Undoubtedly the pope was so preoccupied with the problem of the Anglo-Imperial alliance that he failed at this time to understand the grave threat to peace in Edward's refusal to acknowledge Philip as king of France.

About this time Benedict seems to have had some misgiving as to the efficacy of his intervention and that of his nuncios in the widening breach between England and France. He became somewhat panicky, issuing a series of contradictory instructions to the cardinals. At first, he advised them not to offer themselves as mediators until asked for, probably hoping the two kings would be able to adjust their differences amicably. Perhaps he feared that even the slightest intervention might unfavourably disturb the precarious balance. He soon changed his tactics believing, possibly, that the Anglo-Imperial alliance had so far increased the bitterness between Edward and Philip as to make any *entente* between them impossible. Accordingly, he reversed his previous instructions to the legates, now ordering them to offer themselves and undertake whatever labours might be necessary for the cause of peace.[9] He sent them letters to the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Durham[10] requiring them to warn Edward of the perils attendant on his continued alliance with Louis. He also sent them letters to the chapter of Liège and the towns of the diocese ordering them to support their bishop in his resistance to the claim of homage made by Edward as Imperial Vicar.[11] A week later, however, he ordered the nuncios to desist from any exasperating process and not to deliver these letters, since Edward

[7] Rymer, II, 1065.
[8] *Ibid.*, II, 1066.
[9] Daumet, No. 527.
[10] Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 570.
[11] *Ibid.*, 571.

at the time appeared to be well affected toward the pope. However, should the king's actions prove inimical to the cause of peace, the cardinals were instructed to deliver the letters since it might be necessary for the pope to take further steps against him.[12]

But if Benedict planned to take apostolic steps against Edward he by no means countenanced French antagonism toward England. When, therefore, Philip allowed his men to seize the factors of certain Florentine merchants and to take their money and goods on the ground that they favoured Edward, the pope wrote the French king gently berating him for his folly, and suggesting that these merchants would be hardly likely to do anything to promote war, since their business was increased by peace between France and England.[13] Although one may doubt the soundness of Benedict's economics, it must be admitted that his intentions were good: he was obviously trying to dispel any fresh causes of bitterness between England and France.

Nevertheless the pope probably regarded Philip's action as that of a desperate man, frightened by the prospect of an Anglo-German invasion of his realm. Consequently Benedict renewed his efforts to pave the way for peace by breaking up the Anglo-Imperial alliance either through threatening Edward with ecclesiastical censures,[14] or by hastening the reconciliation of Louis with the church. In December, 1338, Benedict wrote Louis promising him the friendship of Philip as soon as his reconciliation with the Holy See should take place. The cardinal of Verdala, papal legate to the emperor, was instructed to tell him that the pope ardently desired him to come back to the way of repentance, and that "as much as our honour and that of the Church allows it," Benedict would be ready to ease the conditions to which Louis would have to submit in order to obtain apostolic pardon.[15]

[12] Daumet, No. 527.
[13] Daumet, No. 531.
[14] Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 570.
[15] Raynaldus, 1338, Nos. 16, 17. This was a great concession for the pope to make in view of the defiance of the papacy by the German electors at the Diets of Rense (July 16, 1338) and Frankfort (August 8, 1338), and the separation of the jurisdiction of Empire and Church proclaimed at Frankfort. Benedict had confirmed the excommunication of Louis, but refrained from declaring him deposed. Raynaldus, 1338, Nos. 10, 13, 14; C. Müller, *op. cit.*, II, 66–68, 74–78; 293.

By this time Edward had been on the continent for some six months but actual warfare had not yet broken out. In December, he appointed several envoys to treat with Philip whom he graciously referred to as the King of France.[16] Possibly Benedict thought Edward's admission of Philip's title to the crown indicated that war would not break out. On receiving news of the suspension of hostilities the pope wrote his nuncios desiring them to inform him if their presence could be of further service; if not, they would be needed by the pope for other tasks.[17] Here again Benedict seemed inclined to regard a truce more as the ending of war than the suspension of it. The cardinals, however, being, as the pope himself implied, better able to judge the situation, thought it expedient to negotiate further with Philip, and then proceed to Germany. Receiving Benedict's permission to undertake the first of these projects,[18] they conferred with the French king at Pontoise.

Meanwhile Edward continued his efforts to secure additional allies, especially in Germany,[19] and asked the clergy of the province of York for money to enable him to carry on an offensive and defensive war to recover the rights of his crown, and to defend the church and the realm.[20] By the middle of February, 1339, news reached England that the French were planning to invade the country within a month. Consequently, the Duke of Cornwall, regent in Edward's absence, ordered both clergy and laity to arm their servants and furnish men for the defense of the country.[21] Nor did Philip seem less intent on war than Edward: the conference at Pontoise, suggested by the papal legates, came to naught. Almost Benedict himself despaired of peace. Writing his nuncios, he thanked and commended them for their efforts in the interests of peace, even though they were apparently without result. Nevertheless the pope greatly hoped that even if his labours and those of the cardinals should prove ineffectual, yet would

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[16] Rymer, II, 1068.
[17] Daumet, No. 543.
[18] *Ibid.*, No. 559.
[19] Treaties with the Dukes of Austria, Styria, and Carinthia, for the hire of 200 armed men for the war "now waging" between England and France. Rymer, II, 1073.
[20] Rymer, II, 1072. The clergy of the province of Canterbury had already contributed.
[21] Rymer, II, 1072.

they have the consolation of having done their duty, "and will be excused before God and man in continuing their endeavours until, which God forbid, they become wholly useless."[22]

Regarding the second plan of the nuncios—that they proceed to Germany—the pope refused his permission. He gave three reasons for his refusal: because of the risk involved to their persons; because the Germans had rendered themselves unworthy of such a visit from any cardinal; and thirdly, because Benedict was awaiting the return of his chaplain, Verdala, papal nuncio to Louis of Bavaria, who was to bring to Avignon the emperor's answer to papal exhortations to speed his reconciliation with the Holy See.[23] Apparently the pope felt he had made all the concessions he could in regard to Louis. On the other hand, the two cardinals might have been more successful than the pope in breaking up the Anglo-Imperial alliance had they been permitted to visit the emperor.

Nevertheless, Benedict's objection to the proposal on the ground of the risk involved was fairly sound. During April, 1339, there was some difficulty regarding safe-conducts for the papal nuncios. The war zone was constantly spreading, and already three of Edward's couriers, returning with letters from the pope, had been seized in the diocese of Valence, despoiled of their horses, money, and papal letters, and carried off to the castle of Beaucaire where they had been imprisoned. Benedict peremptorily ordered the keeper of the castle, Robert de Pomaye, to set his prisoners free in order to avoid the sentences incurred by those who seize and detain persons coming and going from the Apostolic See.[24] In June, the cardinal nuncios received a prolongation of the terms of their safe-conduct, but for fifteen days only. Benedict, however, wrote them that he wished them to remain not only for fifteen days, but for as much longer as they should consider it expedient.[25] Apparently the presence of the envoys had some slight effect, for on July 1, 1339, Edward appointed nine persons to treat with Philip for full peace and a

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[22] Daumet, No. 574.
[23] *Ibid.*, No. 574.
[24] *Ibid.*, No. 594.
[25] *Ibid.*, No. 602.

perpetual treaty; failing that, at least for a suspension of the war.[26]

The king of England, nevertheless, now openly claimed the throne of France. While he wrote at length to the pope explaining his right to that kingdom,[27] his envoys to Philip at this time did not include the claim in their conditions for either the suspension of war or the negotiation of a full peace and perpetual treaty. They did insist, however, that during the proposed truce: the losses incurred on either side should be made good; allies and friends of either party should pass freely over the lands and dominions of both kings; merchandise also should be thus freely transported; Philip should give no help to the Scots; and finally, that he should restore whatever part of the Duchy of Aquitaine he had occupied since Edward left England a year ago. The pope wholly approved of the first and third conditions. Regarding the second one, he suggested the further provision that no armed men should enter the lands of either king during the truce. As to the Scots, he cautioned that an Anglo-Scotish truce be observed for the period of the proposed truce between England and France; or else that the question of the relations of England and Scotland be placed in his hands as well as the relations of France and England. The fifth point of the English proposals—the restoration of districts in Aquitaine—seemed to Benedict the most important and probably the one which would cause most difficulty. Therefore, he warned his representatives to give no answer to any of the conditions, but to act as mediators along the lines suggested by the pope and as they might see expedient.[28] It is apparent that the pope clearly understood the points at issue. His suggestions to modify the conditions for the truce were shrewd. He foresaw that if armed men were forbidden to travel from one country to another, truces would be more difficult to break. The question of Aquitaine he rightly estimated as the most difficult of the lot. It is clear that he chafed at the restrictions put upon his efforts at mediation by his distance from the

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[26] Rymer, II, 1084.
[27] July 16, 1339. Rymer, II, 1086–1087; Murimuth, 91–100.
[28] Daumet, No. 620.

conflict; that he was forced to permit his nuncios to act with a fairly free hand. Rather than disrupt the chances for peace, however, he wisely advised the cardinals not to intrude his own proposals at the cost of antagonizing the two kings.

On the other hand, Benedict's suggestions presupposed an earnest desire on the part of England and France and their respective adherents to strictly maintain and enforce the truce, standards which Edward and Philip demanded of each other, rather than of themselves. Thus in September, 1339, Edward briskly attacked Cambrai, whose lord, on the advice of Benedict, had refused to recognize the king of England as Imperial Vicar.[29] It was during the siege of this city that one of the papal legates, Cardinal Bertrand, who accompanied the king, was led by an English knight to the top of a tower whence he could observe by night the flaming houses whose brightness disclosed the destruction wrought by fire and sword. The cardinal, recalling his two-year labours for peace while witnessing the two-day devastation of war, fell in a swoon to the ground.[30]

Meanwhile, Edward had informed the cardinals that he would consent to a truce only under the conditions set forth by his envoys. However he would condescend, out of reverence for the Apostolic See, to inform the papal representatives "not as arbitrators but as mediators" regarding his policies and rights, and the injuries he had suffered from Philip which the nuncios had never fully appreciated. The king desired them to remain at hand believing a truce or peace would be more easily attained after they and the pope should be correctly enlightened regarding Edward's case against Philip. He agreed to send to the papal nuncios his own envoys with full powers to treat for peace providing Philip should do likewise. When the French envoys heard of Edward's remarks to the cardinals they promptly considered the treaty broken off.

In great perplexity the papal legates asked the advice of the pope who suggested they continue their efforts. Benedict told them they could not give up now without being blamed by the

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[29] *Chronique Normande* (ed. Molinier), 41, ff.; Fierens, No. 499.
[30] Le Baker, 65.

common herd who would murmur against both pope and cardinals; they could not leave the ship without bringing it into port. Should they do so, Benedict would be compelled to send others in their place. For these reasons he urged them to hold fast to their mission with all possible diligence and solicitude. Although his recent orders forbade them to leave France, he now urged them to go to Edward if they could without risk. If the two kings could not be persuaded to peace, and should the nuncios think it not displeasing to Philip, the pope authorized them to proclaim a truce and enjoin its acceptance on the two monarchs. This truce was to be drafted along the lines recently suggested by the pope,[31] providing there be nothing in it derogatory to the honour of Philip whom Benedict told them they would always find to be obedient and reasonable.[32] It is to be doubted if these recommendations wholly dispelled the perplexity of the papal legates. Apparently Benedict thought Philip at this time disposed to peace; he was on the defensive, and the pope had not only justified defensive warfare against heretical invaders of France, but had, as we have seen, ordered the clergy to contribute to the defense financially.

Accordingly, by October, 1339, Benedict pinned most of his hopes for peace on Philip. He wrote him commending his readiness to make peace by listening to the cardinals and securing safe-conduct for the English envoys. Referring to the siege of Cambrai, the pope held that Edward had acted against the church and against the county of Cambrai under pretext of his illegal appointment as vicar of the Empire. The assumption here seems to be that it was was Edward's unfortunate connection with the emperor that precipitated the siege. The pope informed Philip that Edward's German allies were engaged in pillaging in the county of Cambrai "thinking perhaps thereby to provoke king Philip to attack them, and so give an excuse to the princes and others of Germany to invade France." Since Benedict protested that he had Philip's interests at heart, he suggested that the King await the threatened invasion, meanwhile taking counsel and

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[31] *Ante*, p. 000.
[32] Daumet, No. 644.

making due preparation.[33] Obviously the pope did not believe that to attack first is the best defense.

As a matter of fact he felt that hostilities might still be avoided between England and France could Edward be persuaded to abandon his alliance with the emperor. Four days later, on October 12, the pope wrote to the king insisting that the latter renounce the office of vicar. Once again the horrible heresies of Louis were recited at length, and his sorry plight as an outcast from the Church was pointed out as an object lesson to Edward. The pope was amazed that the king had so far disregarded papal requests to refrain from alliance with heretics, as to accept the vicariate of the Empire, albeit illegally bestowed, and under colour of it to besiege Cambrai. Once again the king was urged to consider his dangerous position, and to beware the apostolic severity demanded by Benedict's office. Unless the siege of Cambrai were abandoned and the office of vicar resigned, the pope would proceed to publish the penalties and sentences decreed by John XXII against those who allied themselves with heretics.[34] In a similar vein, Benedict addressed the Archbishop of Canterbury, informing him that the king would be declared to have incurred ecclesiastical penalties should he persist in his present actions.[35]

Meanwhile the king was finding it difficult to persist in his military activities—not, indeed, because of papal threats, but because of the lack of cooperation of his dearly bought allies. On returning from the campaign to Brussels, he wrote to England complaining to the Duke of Cornwall, the Archbishop of Canterbury, his chancellor, and members of his council that his allies were becoming importunate in their wants. At the same time his messengers, who had tarried long in consultation with the papal nuncios and the council of France, had brought no offer of truce from Philip. The latter had grandly declared that Edward should not have "a palm's breadth of land," in France, and that the English should not remain a single day in the realm without being given battle. Edward, however, explained in disgust that

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[33] *Ibid.*, No. 648.
[34] *Ibid.*, No. 649.
[35] *Ibid.*, No. 650.

when battle was offered Philip had cravenly retreated without a blow.[36] This was the English king's explanation to his councillors for the delay in the prosecution of the war. Meanwhile he planned to confer on the subject with his allies.[37]

Such was not Benedict's explanation for the checking of hostilities. He preferred to think that Philip was influenced by the papal admonition to wait until attacked; and that Edward, frightened by the threat of excommunication, had not only abandoned the siege of Cambrai, but was about to repudiate his alliance with Louis of Bavaria. The pope, therefore, decided to take full advantage of the lull in the war by urging preparations for peace. About this time (December, 1339), it occurred to him that although the cardinals had been full of zeal in the cause of peace, it might be impossible to attain it through their efforts alone. Therefore, though the pope was a busy person continually harassed by arduous and important business, he offered to mediate personally between the two kings should they so desire, promising to negotiate honestly and impartially for the good of either side and for "the appeasing of God, the love of mankind, and the good of Christendom." Accordingly, he besought Edward to send representatives to Avignon.[38] At the joint request of the pope and cardinals Edward on January 2, 1340, appointed envoys to treat with the papal nuncios and with Philip's representatives regarding the differences between them, in hope of peace, or at least of a suspension of hostilities.[39]

Up to this point the pope's efforts for peace can hardly be regarded as successful. Although no formal declaration of war had yet been made hostilities had broken out at Cambrai. During the years from 1338 to 1339 Benedict's policy of peace had centered in his attempts to break up the Anglo-Imperial alliance. By the end of 1339 this alliance was already beginning to crack, but not on account of papal intervention, although it probably had some slight effect. The pope's advice to Philip to wait until attacked

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[36] Rymer, II, 1069.

[37] This conference was to take place at Tournai on November 14, 1339, but was postponed to February 5, 1340.

[38] Rymer, II, 1103.

[39] *Ibid.*, II, 1104.

was carried out to Edward's disgust and cost, for the French king turned from battle at the one time when England had her allies ready to fight. Nor was it until she had obtained new allies—in Flanders—that the first real battle of the Hundred Years' War was fought.

IV

The Hundred Years' War (3); Papal Efforts to Stop It, 1340-1342

By 1340 all peace negotiations were disrupted by the conclusion of an alliance between England and Flanders. Hitherto, the Flemings had preserved a neutrality regarding the Anglo-French conflict. For some time, however, Edward had been attempting to obtain their assistance. Aided by Van Artevelde, a treaty was finally signed between the English and the Flemings on January 4, 1340. Edward was recognized as king of France, and it was agreed that the campaign against Philip should begin with the besieging of Tournai.[1] To the English king, the alliance seemed to compensate for the ineffectiveness of his agreement with Louis of Bavaria; to the French king, it seemed the final menace to his kingdom; while to the pope, it seemed to postpone indefinitely the prospects of peace. Philip tried in vain to bring back the Flemings to obedience to their Count's authority. Being balked in all his efforts by Van Artevelde, he angrily urged the pope to excommunicate the rebellious Flemings, in accordance with an old treaty which made this provision.[2] Benedict in reply wrote the Flemings exhorting them to renounce their pact with Edward. In answer to the pope's exhortations, they replied, on January 12, 1340, that they were not liable to excommunication for breaking their oaths toward Philip, since Edward was rightfully king of France.[3]

During the last two years of Benedict's pontificate, papal efforts to make peace between England and France were all but ruined by the Anglo-Flemish alliance together with the policies which

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[1] Rymer, II, 1106; Kervyn de Lettenhove, *Histoire de Flandre*, III, *Pièces Justificatives*, No. iv.

[2] The treaty of Athies of 1308. Kervyn, *op. cit.*, III, 28, 31; H. Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, II, 123; *Chron. et Annales de Flandres* (ed. P. d'Oudegherst), 234–235.

[3] Raynaldus, 1340, No. 3.

grew out of it. In the first place, it made war more certain since it gave England continental allies who had strategic importance, for Flanders has often been regarded as the ideal battleground for Anglo-French conflicts. Secondly, it forced the pope to place an interdict on Flanders,[4] thereby giving Edward one more excuse to accuse him of partiality toward the French cause. Finally, the alliance resulted in Edward's openly claiming the French crown, a claim which was to hinder all efforts for peace for years to come.

Both the Flemings and Edward, secure in their renewed friendship, now openly defied not only Philip[5] but the pope. Replying to Benedict's offer to mediate in person between England and France, Edward thanked him, but proceeded to assert the justness of his title to the French crown. For the pope's information the king rehearsed once again his cause against Philip, complaining that though he himself had been always ready to make peace, Philip, because of his insatiable desire for domination, had merely pretended to desire peace. For a long time the French king had treated with Edward regarding a peace which he did not want, at a great cost to the latter, hoping to bankrupt the English by treating for peace so as to make them helpless to wage war. This was a new accusation and shows that Edward found negotiations for peace an added expense which he could not afford. Thereupon he refused to treat any longer with Philip unless he were prepared to offer acceptable conditions guaranteeing English rights. If, however, through the mediation of either the papal nuncios or the pope himself, a way of peace might be found which would not be detrimental to Edward's rights, Benedict was assured that the English king would show himself ready to stop the war.[6]

Early in February, 1340, the king publicly announced his claim to the throne of France, ordering a document to that effect to be placed on the doors of the churches throughout Flanders "so that no one may excuse himself through ignorance" as to who was the

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[4] The excommunication was pronounced on April 4, 1340, by the Bishop of Senlis and the Abbot of St. Denis, Kervyn, III, 241; *Chron. des Quatre Premiers Valois*, 7; *Chron. Normande*, 48.

[5] Murimuth, 110–114, for Edward's challenge to Philip, and the latter's reply.

[6] Rymer, II, 1107–1108.

true king of France. The proclamation was also sent to all counts, barons, nobles and commons of the kingdom of France, warning them to accept Edward as their king or be prepared to suffer the consequence of treason. It was ordered that all those who, between February and Easter, should recognize Edward's claim would be given English protection and defense.[7] On February 21st, the king left for England where he remained until June 22d. In Flanders, as security for his return—and possibly for the money he promised the Flemings for their aid—he left four earls to continue negotiations with Van Artevelde.[8]

Meanwhile, Benedict in March received Edward's letter claiming the French throne. The pope wrote the king expressing his shock at observing the new title and the seal engraved with the combined arms of France and England. The pope, thinking the king had been led by perverse counsels, prepared to put sounder ones before him. The king should respect the custom of France which did not permit succession to the crown through the female line. Even if custom permitted it, there were others nearer the throne than Edward. Should the king vainly think to occupy France by force, he would do well to consider the might and magnificence of Philip who, in spite of Edward's claims, still ruled France, while the English king possessed nothing in France. The pope, however, was careful not to jeopardize the cause of peace by antagonizing Edward. He therefore blamed his usurping of the title and arms of France on evil counsel, particularly that of the Flemings, in which case the king would do well to consider the source. For they had often before driven their natural lords from the country, "basely casting off their fealty." Thus the king should question whether his title, based on Flemish fealty, was secure. The pope shrewdly pointed out that Edward had already done liege homage to Philip for his fiefs in France, so that in styling himself king of France he caused men to wonder not at his discernment but at his simpleness and vanity. Benedict was not satisfied with pointing out only the moral and legal aspects of the situation, but gave practical reasons why Edward for his own sake should abandon his claims. He should realize how many

[7] *Ibid.*, II, 1111.
[8] Rymer, II, 1111; *Grandes Chron.*, V, 405.

kings, princes, and magnates were allied with Philip by blood or treaty who would immediately oppose the English king's pretensions; while the people of France, the pope assured him solemnly, would do and dare all in defense of their king and country. Wherefore, Benedict suggested, it would be more to Edward's advantage to ally himself with the loyal French, rather than with the treacherous Germans and Flemings who would be friendly only until they had exhausted his resources. For these reasons, the pope once again urged the king to drop his claim to the French crown and, turning his mind to peace, make a concord with Philip, his kinsman and proper ally.[9]

About the same time the pope received a letter from Philip who thanked him for his offer to mediate in person and accordingly agreed to send him envoys with full power to treat for peace providing Edward would do likewise. The pope, while commending the French king's intention,[10] was forced to admit that Edward's was stubbornly warlike.

Although Benedict had, as we have seen, cautioned Edward to beware the might and magnificence of the king of France, Philip himself now suggested that his power needed strengthening, and asked the pope to contribute to it through ecclesiastical levies. On March 1, 1340, Benedict accordingly authorized Philip to levy a tenth for two years on the clergy of France to help him repel his enemies.[11] On March 20 the king thanked him for the money granted but, like Oliver Twist, proceeded to ask for more. Philip's envoy, Peter de Verberie, had already tried without success to persuade the pope to allow the king to use the tenths collected for the crusade. The latter now added his requests to those of his envoy, explaining that already a large part of the money levied for the crusade had been well spent for that enterprise. If Philip had disposed of the rest of the money for his own undertakings, it was because he believed himself authorized to do so on the advice of prelates as well as councillors who had told him he could use the money for the defense of his endangered states.

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[9] Rymer, II, 1117.
[10] Daumet, No. 697.
[11] Ibid., No. 696.

It will be noticed here that Philip was taking full advantage of the pope's countenancing of defensive warfare. He now boldly informed Benedict that he intended to attack the Duke of Brabant because he had dared to defy him, and, moreover, expected to send his eldest son, the Duke of Normandy, to lead the attack. In view of the prospect of actual battle, the French king seemed worried for fear he might die in mortal sin. Wherefore, "since the lot of combat is doubtful and the hour of death is uncertain," he besought Benedict to relieve him of the oath which he had taken for himself and his heirs not to touch the subsidies destined for the expedition to the Holy Land, and to absolve both him and his son of "the sin which they have committed in violation of this promise."[12]

Nevertheless, the king apparently felt that a well-equipped army would go far to lessen the doubtfulness of combat. Consequently he told the pope that although he earnestly desired his pardon for oath-breaking, should it be denied, he "would not feel his conscience burdened" inasmuch as he felt he had acted according to the advice of his prelates and had been "pushed by a necessity which God knows is urgent." Moreover, it was impossible for him at the present time to restore any of the borrowed money, but he assured the pope that he sincerely planned to pay it back in the future, naïvely suggesting six years after the end of the war as a possible date. To further explain and justify his actions, he sent the Cardinals of Palestrina and Talleyrand, the Archbishop of Rouen, and the Bishop of Autun to the pope who, he hoped, would hearken to their pleas on his behalf.[13]

In April, Benedict, after listening to the pleas of the French envoys, wrote Philip soundly scolding him for turning to profane use the money collected for a sacred cause. Never could the Holy See consent to such impiety; and the pope was indeed astonished that some bishops and councillors had dared to assure the king that he might violate his oath in this connection. Philip should be warned that such persons truly cared but little for the

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[12] *Ibid.*, No. 708.
[13] *Ibid.*, No. 708.

soul of their master and that of the prince to hold honour so cheaply.[14]

Although the pope had already granted two special tenths to Philip for defense against heretical invaders he was not willing to lay himself open to Edward's frequent charge that he countenanced Philip's use for secular war the money collected for the crusade. To Edward, of course, this distinction must have appeared purely metaphysical.

In May, 1340, an unfortunate affair occurred which threatened to break up negotiations for peace which were now going on simultaneously—if somewhat half-heartedly—in England, France, and at Avignon. One of Edward's ambassadors, Nicholas Flisco, was sent at the beginning of the year on a double mission: to treat with the pope concerning peace, and to arrange for the hire of some Genoese galleys for the war.[15] Shortly before Easter (April 13th), he with his son and a friend were seized by persons unknown and taken for a ride in a boat up the Rhone.[16] Benedict, indignant at the outrage, took severe measures. He not only ordered a thorough search to be made for the sons of perdition who had perpetrated the crime, but placed an interdict on all places—especially in France—where Nicholas and the two others were being detained.[17] Naturally enough, Philip was suspected of having instigated the affair. On May 21, however, he wrote the pope denying all complicity in the outrage. On the contrary, from the moment he learned of the presence in France of the guilty parties, he had ordered an extensive search to be made for them. Should they be found, they would be immediately sent to Avignon. Rumour had it that the culprits were officers of the king of France, but Philip charged that they were certain papal officials in whom Benedict had confided. Finally, the king begged the pope to turn a deaf ear to those who suggested malicious things regarding the court of France since they assuredly did so in the hope of estranging Philip and Benedict. Accordingly, he asked the pope to remove

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[14] *Ibid.*, No. 713.
[15] Rymer, II, 1111.
[16] Baluze, i, 217.
[17] Daumet, No. 715.

the sentences cast upon those districts of France and elsewhere which the latter, in his first severity at the offense, had caused to be promulgated.[18] On receiving this news, the pope, perhaps feeling he had acted hastily and undoubtedly hoping to maintain friendly relations with France so as not to imperil the peace negotiations still in progress, ordered the interdict to be suspended.[19]

The affair, of course, had repercussions in England. On the first of June, Edward wrote the pope expressing his astonishment at hearing of the attack made upon one of his envoys sent to Avignon to expose his rights to the throne of France. He pointed out that the foul crime clearly showed the extent of Philip's hatred toward him, as well as a deplorable lack of respect for the Holy See. Responsibility for avenging the outrage rested with Benedict who, Edward ingratiatingly remarked, had been placed by God above all peoples and nations in order to avenge them. The crime committed against all right and justice should be punished for the glory of the righteous and the terror of vipers.[20] Using this injury as an excuse, Edward refused to send envoys to Avignon for fear they too would be imprisoned and perhaps assassinated. Moreover he professed he could find no one among his group of diplomats who would now accept so perilous an honour as that of ambassador to the pope. As soon, however, as he should hear that wise measures had been taken to prevent further crimes and to apprehend those guilty of the present one, and that tranquility was restored at the papal court, Edward would again send his envoys.[21]

In spite of his protestations to the contrary, the king, at the end of April, had sent Richard Wynkley, a Dominican monk, to Benedict to inform him that Edward was planning to send an embassy to treat of peace.[22] While the pope received the envoy and his message graciously, he complained that Edward had not as yet made any satisfactory reply to his warning to him regard-

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[18] *Ibid.*, No. 720.
[19] On May 30. Daumet, No. 722.
[20] Rymer, II, 1126.
[21] *Ibid.*, II, 1126. See Baluze for an account of the hanging of the guilty, *op. cit.*, 217–218, 208–209; *Gesta Edwardi tertii* (Bridlington), 139.
[22] Rymer, II, 1121.

ing the king's usurpation of the French crown and his alliance with Louis of Bavaria.[23] About the same time, Philip informed the pope that the emperor had sent his wife to the French king with a message wherein Louis offered to serve as mediator in the Anglo-French dispute, should the two kings agree. Perhaps it was the emperor's desire to withdraw from the war himself, to obtain the good will of France, or to pave the way for his own reconciliation with the Holy See that led him to make this proposal. Possibly he felt that the recent scandal arising from the abduction of the English envoy combined with Benedict's now failing health, might render possible the substitution of imperial for papal arbitration. Although the emperor's offer was not accepted, the fact that it was even suggested was undoubtedly humiliating to the pope.[24]

During the early summer of 1340 while ways and means for making peace were thus being considered, both Edward and Philip were of course busily preparing for war. Although warned that the Channel was infested by French ships,[25] and in spite of the dissuasions of his chancellor, the Archbishop of Canterbury,[26] Edward left with his fleet for Flanders on June 26th, and a few days later occurred the naval battle off Sluys in which the English and their Flemish allies were victorious.[27] A month later, they energetically began the siege of Tournai. The war had at last begun in earnest.

The pope, however, did not give up either his hopes or his efforts for peace. On August 20th, he ordered the archbishops of England and France to have processions made and litanies sung so that God might stop the war.[28] Writing to the councillors of Philip and of Edward, he exhorted them to persuade their respective kings to act for the good of Christendom, themselves, and their realms by making peace.[29] About this time Benedict

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[23] *Ibid.*, II, 1130.
[24] Daumet, No. 727.
[25] Avesbury, 311; C. de la Roncière, *Histoire de la Marine Française*, I, 437–444.
[26] See T. F. Trout's account of Edward's struggle at this time with Stratford, *op. cit.*, 343 ff.; also Avesbury, 324–336.
[27] La Roncière, *op. cit.*, 1, 440, ff.
[28] Daumet, No. 749.
[29] *Ibid.*, No. 765.

came to the conclusion that the cardinal nuncios, having been able to do so little, should be replaced by other envoys, preferably of lesser rank since they would be able to travel more quickly than the cardinals and would be less burden to the churches.[30]

Accordingly, he now sent William Amicus to Philip, and William of Norwich to Edward, giving them detailed instructions as to the carrying out of their mission for peace. William Amicus was to first apologize to Philip for the pope's delay in sending his representatives to treat for peace. The delay was caused by Edward's refusal to send properly accredited envoys to the pope,[31] by his failure to reply to the papal letters condemning his usurpation of the title of king of France, and by the battle of Sluys. The legate was to set forth the pope's fears for the safety of the king and his eldest son: should they be killed in battle, the realm would be overturned. Nor was defeat improbable. The Flemings had taken the field with a large force in conjunction with Edward's army; in Aquitaine there were great disturbances; and the English king had, through his defeat of the French fleet, a "free hand to do what he liked in the lands bordering on the coast." Thus the menace to France from land and sea was great. Internally, the country was endangered both by those who disliked the war on account of the heavy taxes, and by those who desired war because of the opportunities for heavy profits. Besides, there was the menace of the infidels in various places who were ready to attack Christendom.[32]

The pope, however, was not content with pointing out only the practical disadvantages of war. He proceeded to make certain practical suggestions for peace. Regarding Aquitaine, he suggested that fealty, homage, and overlordship should rest with Philip. Should the king disagree, then should he send envoys—"not Teutons"—empowered to name Benedict as arbiter with power to enforce the observation of the proposed treaty of peace. Or, should the king prefer it, the pope would send solemn nuncios to negotiate a truce. Unfortunately, the pope himself could not

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[30] *Ibid.*, No. 764.

[31] Benedict complained that Edward had sent only a master of theology whose mission came to nothing. Daumet, No. 764.

[32] The pope feared particularly the inroads threatened by the Moors.

go to meet the kings' envoys because of his infirmity. Benedict here offered Philip a wide range of suggestions, and concluded his letter with the hope that the king would adopt at least one of them in reply. Nevertheless, the pope earnestly hoped that Philip would agree with him that it was "unfitting that the enemies of the church and realm take part in the treaty of peace."[33] Possibly Benedict had a premonition of the alliance that was soon to be made between Philip and Louis of Bavaria.

The instructions issued to William of Norwich, papal legate to Edward, were detailed and appropriate to the case. The nuncio was to remind the king that he should not be unwilling to make peace on account of the victories he had already gained, for there was always the chance that defeat might be his lot in the next engagement. Nor should the king count on his allies for much assistance, since they were an unreliable lot. Furthermore, he would do well to consider the immense power of resistance of the king of France who, "though he had lost ten battles," still had many people left, while Edward was at a disadvantage being away from his own people and hence cut off from the source of supplies. Benedict shrewdly recommended that the king study history which would clearly show him that his ancestors who at one time possessed more revenues within the realm of France than its king, yet were finally driven out after losing everything.[34] Edward should ponder on this and give up his unjust claim to the French crown, being content with the Duchy of Gascony, holding it on the same terms as his grandfather did. It will be noticed that the pope was making suggestions to Edward which, if accepted, might pave the way for accord with Philip, especially on the subject of Aquitaine.

At the same time Benedict could not resist condemning once again Edward's alliance with the heretical Louis of Bavaria, reminding him of the censures issued against the emperor which involved Edward through his acceptance of the vicariate. However, the pope refrained from rehearsing the old, old story of Louis' perfidy at this time, probably because he realized that the

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[33] Daumet, No. 763.
[34] Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 582.

Anglo-Imperial alliance was about to be broken up through its very ineffectiveness.[35]

The pope was particularly anxious at this time to make peace between Philip and Edward on account of the increasing threat of the Moors to invade Spain.[36] He therefore besought Edward as well as Philip to consider the dangers and risks attendant upon their war not only in their own realms but throughout Christendom. Benedict suspected that Edward hesitated to put his cause in papal hands on account of the French complexion of the pontifical court. He assured him, therefore, of his special good-will toward him and his kingdom and insisted that "in matters which do not regard the Roman church and its patrimony" the cardinals, French or otherwise, were not consulted.[37]

Fortunately for the pope's desire for peace, but unfortunately for his wish to bring it about through papal mediation, a truce was signed on September 24, 1340, by Edward and Philip at Esplechin as a result of secular mediation. Jeanne of Valois, mother of the Count of Hainault and the Queen of England, sister of the king of France, abbess of Fontenelles, was moved by the desolation wrought at Tournai to interpose on behalf of peace.[38] Probably her relationship to the chief belligerents lent some weight to her efforts for, aided by John of Bohemia, she was permitted after some opposition to join the conferences, going back and forth between camps. Papal exhortations had left the two kings cold to the proposal of peace; Jeanne's pleading was favourably received because the allies were already weary of war and rightly suspicious of Edward's ability to pay them.[39] The truce provided for the suspension of hostilities until June, 1341. Moreover, both Edward and Philip agreed that the papacy should remain neutral and not interfere in diplomatic questions which did not concern it.[40] At the same time Philip agreed to renounce his old right to have the Flemings excommunicated for rebellion,

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[35] *Ibid.*, II, 582–583.
[36] *Ibid.*, II, 582.
[37] Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 583.
[38] Knighton, II, 19.
[39] Déprez, *op. cit.*, 343; Lucas, *op. cit.*, 420–421; Rocquain, *op. cit.*, II, 459; Tout, *op. cit.*, 459.
[40] Rymer, II, 1135–1136; Avesbury, 317–320.

and consented to seek an annulment of the interdict from the pope.[41]

After the truce had been made, both Philip and Edward replied to the letters sent them by Benedict through his nuncios, William Amicus and William of Norwich. On October 27, Philip wrote that he would be pleased to have the pope act "as a private person" in mediating between himself and Edward. Although the French king thought that the right to decide the question of Gascony belonged to him by virtue of his suzerainty, yet he consented to papal arbitration on the question. This was only to be expected, since, as we have seen, the pope suggested that the question be settled in Philip's favour. The king, however, stipulated that before the peace conferences began,[42] Edward should renounce the title of French king and cease to use the seal of France.[43]

A few weeks later Edward also wrote the pope, dating his letter the first year of his reign as king of France. He told Benedict that before receiving the papal letters brought by William of Norwich, he had been besieging Tournai. Although he had every chance of success in the siege, he had nevertheless, in the hope of a treaty of peace, made a truce to last until June, 1341. Although the truce provided that peace conferences should take place on November 10th. Edward on receiving, the pope's letters, had extended the time until February 2 in order to be able to inform Benedict of the justice of his cause and to obtain papal advice before the conferences should begin. For this purpose he was sending to the pope William of Norwich, John of Offord, and John of Thoresby, and begged Benedict to answer "with due regard to the shortness of the time and the gravity of the business.[44]

Through his envoys, Edward now proceeded at great length to present his case in full to the pope. Going back to the time of his accession to the throne, he recounted one by one the villainies committed by Philip: his help to the Scots, his attacks on Aquitaine, his threatened invasion of England. While Edward had made numerous reasonable proposals for peace, Philip had refused

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[41] Lucas, *op. cit.*, 422.
[42] The truce set November 10th as the date.
[43] Daumet, No. 787.
[44] Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 583–584. Along with the envoys, Edward sent Nicholas de Flisco for whose liberation he thanked the pope.

them all. The English king then rehearsed the whole question of the succession to the French throne and told the pope how the holiest and wisest men of the land—including Parliament and the Council—had concluded that the throne devolved upon Edward. It was on the advice of Parliament and his council that the king resolved to prosecute his right to the French throne by force. To do this effectively, allies were necessary. Wherefore envoys were sent to make alliances. In order to recover his rights to the French throne Edward had besieged Cambrai. On returning to England, he had heard of a proposed French invasion. Therefore he had prepared to purge the sea, which he did at Sluys. After the naval victory he had proceeded to lay siege to Tournai, counting on his chancellor's promise to supply him with money.[45] However, since he had received not a penny during the entire period of the siege, he had been forced to make a truce.[46]

Edward, like Philip, agreed to papal arbitration in which the pope should act as a person rather than by virtue of his office. This was probably because of the provision of the Truce of Esplechin that the pope should not interfere in diplomatic questions which did not concern him. The king of England expressed his intention not to make peace without Benedict's mediation and direction. However, he insisted that he would treat the whole kingdom of France as lawfully his by right of succession. Nevertheless, out of reverence for the pope and to avoid ruining peace negotiations before they began, Edward professed himself ready to consent to a good peace providing only that reasonable consideration be given to his rights not only in the duchy of Aquitaine, but in the kingdom of France itself. He felt he could not be content even should it be proposed that "liege" homage be abolished and that he hold the duchy by simple homage to Philip. Finally, the king suggested that he would send his envoys providing Philip would do likewise, and that the peace conference between them should take place in February at Avignon, in the presence of the pope. He warned Benedict to keep secret his in-

[45] Edward complained to Benedict that he believed the archbishop wished him through lack of money to be betrayed and even killed. The king instructed his envoys, however, to keep secret these complaints. Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 584.

[46] *Ibid.*, II, 584.

tentions until Philip should reveal his own to the pope.[47]

On December 18, 1340, the pope replied to Edward's letter saying he had not yet received Philip's answer. However, it appeared to him that Edward's suggestions together with the explanations of his envoys scarcely made for peace. On the contrary, they appeared to "light up the fires of dissension." Reciting the evils of war at some length the pope besought the king to consider them well, and to continue negotiations for peace by sending his envoys to Avignon to meet Philip's there.[48]

Three days later, the pope wrote in a similar vein to Philip,[49] informing him of Edward's proposals. This act may be considered a breach of trust, inasmuch as Edward had asked the pope to keep secret his suggestions for peace until Philip had declared his own. On the other hand, if the pope were to assume the rôle of mediator and go-between, he could hardly get very far by playing the part of mere father confessor. Furthermore, the information he gave Philip—that Edward insisted on having his claim to the French throne recognized as a preliminary step to peace—was hardly news to the king of France.

In view of Edward's difficult conditions for peace which Benedict realized would be unacceptable to Philip, the pope fell back on his earlier policy of stimulating war against the infidel as a means of effecting peace among Christians. He therefore called the attention of both kings to the recent triumph[50] won by the Spanish kings who had joined together, forgetting their private quarrels, to repulse the foul Saracens.[51] He urged Philip and Edward to do likewise, and to consider the miseries of war especially when waged between two Christian princes.[52] It is apparent that the pope was becoming infirm in spirit as well as in body. He no longer made practical suggestions for the basis of peace, but rather used moral arguments against war, arguments which were meaningless to those kings who felt their honour depended on the outcome of battle.

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[47] Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 585–586.
[48] Daumet, No. 800.
[49] *Ibid.*, No. 801.
[50] At Tarifa, October 30, 1340.
[51] Daumet, No. 801.
[52] Cal. Pap. Reg., II, 589; Daumet, No. 801.

In spite of papal plans for the peace conference to take place at Avignon, it was never held there. Indeed, in all the negotiations leading up to the prolongation of the Truce of Esplechin on September 27, no mention was made of either the pope or his legates.[53] During the period of the truce, new preparations for war continued on both sides, while new alliances were formed. Louis of Bavaria was weaned away from Edward from whom he withdrew the office of Imperial Vicar, only to make an alliance with Philip, again offering himself as mediator between the two kings.[54]

Benedict was as shocked at the Franco-Imperial alliance as he had formerly been at the Anglo-Imperial one. He immediately protested against it to Philip pointing out that since Louis was still unreconciled with the church, the alliance was a detriment to both Philip's welfare and the pope's honour, especially since it was contracted without Benedict's permission and against his advice. In fact, the latter regarded Philip's action as little short of treachery to the Holy See: "after having acted until now in your (Philip's) interest and always in concert with you, it does not seem to us that you ought, therefore, to transgress or rather to scorn our precepts." Not only was the pope scandalized, but he told Philip that the populace complained that it was an unheard of deed for a Christian prince of the august house of France to contract friendship with heretics and schismatics.[55] These heretics now included, of course, the excommunicated Flemings. Philip, however, anxious to secure their help, and bound by one of the provisions of the Truce of Esplechin consequently asked the pope to lift the interdict.[56] The pope, on consultation with his cardinals, refused the request, logically insisting that so long as the Flemings were in rebellion, they would remain excommunicated.[57]

However consistent the pope may have been in matters theo-

[53] Rymer, II, 1177. The truce was extended to June 24, 1342.
[54] Rymer, II, 1167–1168. As an excuse to withdraw from the Anglo-Imperial alliance, Louis complained that the truce had been made by Edward with Philip without the emperor's participation and against his counsel. Avesbury, 336–337; Knighton, II, 22.
[55] Daumet, No. 832.
[56] *Ibid.*, Nos. 843, 844.
[57] Daumet, No. 852; Fierens, Nos. 673, 692.

logical and legal, the acceptance of papal mediation in international disputes was not furthered thereby. On the contrary there seemed to be a switch toward secular mediation. Already Louis of Bavaria had offered himself as arbiter. Now, moreover, Alphonso XI of Castile, probably hoping for English and French cooperation in his struggle against the Saracens, proposed to mediate between the two kings. Since both Edward and Philip were anxious for an alliance with Alphonso, his offer was accepted.[58] The former, at the request of the king of Castile, sent envoys to treat with Philip regarding peace.[59] The French king at the same time informed the pope that he would gladly accept Alphonso's offer of mediation, and that, since the war was finished, he expected to assist the king of Castile in repulsing the Moors.[60]

Undoubtedly this substitution of secular for papal arbitration in the Anglo-French conflict was a blow to Benedict's diplomacy. However, he could still console himself with the thought that Edward and Philip appeared to be at last accepting the oft-repeated papal advice to forget their private quarrels in joining together to repulse the infidel. Had the pope lived longer he would have seen that the two kings did nothing of the kind. It was war with each other they were determined upon, not just the noise of battle. Moreover, if the efforts of the pope to prevent, check, or stop the Hundred Years' War were unsuccessful in the main, it is only fair to Benedict to point out that few other efforts were made at all, none were carried on so consistently and for so long, and none were attended by more than an apparent success.

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[58] Rymer, II, 1150, 1151; Murimuth, 269–271.
[59] Rymer, II, 1190–1191.
[60] Daumet, No. 843.

V

Papal Efforts for Peace in Sicily, Italy, and Spain, 1334-1342

Conflicts other than the Hundred Years' War claimed the attention of the pope. The Italian expedition of Louis of Bavaria had had unfortunate consequences for Italy. Many of the papal states had been placed under interdict by John XXII for supporting either the emperor himself or one of his imperial vicars whom he had lavishly distributed throughout Italy. It was Benedict's policy, however, to reserve ecclesiastical penalties for situations which peaceful methods were unable to improve.

Shortly after the pope's accession, Frederick of Trinacre refused to do homage to him for Sicily. Benedict, instead of immediately launching ecclesiastical censures against him as Robert of Naples advised,[1] sent as legate Bertrand, Archbishop of Embrun, to persuade him to see the error of his ways. The pope himself wrote Frederick at length, rehearsing the whole situation from the time of the Sicilian Vespers and the usurpation of Peter, Frederick's father.[2] Reproaching the king for his various misdemeanours, especially his aiding schismatic apostates, the pope exhorted him to do homage for Sicily as his duty required. In return for his obedience, Benedict assured him of the help and favours of the Church. The pope apparently thought promises more effective than threats.

Frederick, however, was far from listening to papal exhortations of any kind. Although he was supposed to leave Sicily to Robert of Naples, the king had his son Peter crowned king of Sicily. Robert who, on the death of Frederick (1337) had expected to recover Sicily, complained to the pope.[3] Benedict promised to

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[1] Raynaldus, 1335, No. 49. Robert regarded Frederick as a usurper.
[2] *Ibid.*, 1335, Nos. 51, 52, 67.
[3] G. Villani, xi, c. 70.

allow nothing to be done against Robert's cause, and agreed to assist him whenever possible.[4] Peter, however, having usurped the throne of Sicily, had the audacity to ask Benedict to permit him to be invested with it.[5]

At this point the pope actively intervened. He sent as nuncios to Peter, who was ensconced on the island of Sicily, Gocio, recently created titular patriarch of Constantinople, and Ratier, Bishop of Vaison. The legates took with them a papal bull in which were related the affairs of Sicily from the invasion of Peter I in 1282 to the present. The pope particularly stressed the treaty made between Charles of the House of Anjou, and Frederick of the House of Aragon in 1303. This treaty had been confirmed by Boniface VIII, and Benedict now upheld its provisions.

Consequently, he pointed out various ways in which Frederick had broken the treaty, chiefly by having his son Peter crowned as king. For the treaty provided that Frederick himself was entitled to the crown only during his own lifetime, after which the island was to revert to the House of Aragon. For these reasons, Benedict was sending his nuncios to declare as usurpers all the children or heirs of Frederick including, of course, Peter. The pope further insisted that on Frederick's death, the island of Sicily automatically reverted to the Holy See and was therefore to be reunited with continental Sicily; and that the entire kingdom belonged by right to Robert of Naples as a true feudatory of the Roman Church. Unless Peter restored Sicily within a certain time, he was liable to the most rigourous spiritual and temporal censures.[6]

In September, 1338, the papal legates arrived at Reggio. On the twenty-fifth, they sent out from there four Franciscans who, putting off in a boat, crossed to the island where they attempted to enter Messina. However, they were intercepted and taken to Count Matthew of Palice, Peter's governor of Messina. On hearing the mission of the Franciscans, the governor refused to allow any of them to enter the city, or to present to anyone else the letters that they were carrying. In fact, the governor in-

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[4] Raynaldus, 1337, No. 26.
[5] *Ibid.*, 1338, No. 33.
[6] Raynaldus, 1338, Nos. 42, 45.

formed them that he would not allow the papal nuncios to enter the city either, "nor the pope himself." After being held all day without food or drink, the Franciscans were at length allowed to return to the nuncios at Reggio.

For these reasons the legates, on October 3, 1338, declared by papal authority that Peter of Aragon and his brothers, having no right whatsoever to Sicily, must restore it within two months to Robert of Naples under pain of excommunication; or to present themselves at Terracine within two months to explain why they had not restored the kingdom to its rightful owner. When the time-limit expired on December 4 the legates prepared to excommunicate Peter and his adherents as contumacious. Before pronouncing sentence, however, they gave him another month in which to comply with the terms demanded by the pope. On January 5, 1339, when the time limit again expired without Peter's compliance, the nuncios still postponed pronouncing sentence. However, on April 5th, thoroughly convinced that Peter intended to persist in his contumely, they definitely pronounced sentence against him and his adherents.[7]

Although Benedict had shown no little forbearance in dealing with this case, he was forced to admit the ineffectiveness of pacific methods. Whereupon, he authorized Robert to invade Sicily and recover his rights by force.[8] To enable him to carry on this war more successfully, the pope granted him a tenth for two years on all ecclesiastical goods, the money to be used for the recovery of Sicily.[9] Toward the end of 1339 Robert, acting under this papal order as well as in perfect accordance with his own desires, succeeded in seizing the island of Lipari. Benedict, in congratulating the king, expressed himself as especially well pleased since the victory had been won without great loss of men.[10] Notwithstanding this first success, neither the armed forces of Robert of Naples nor the ecclesiastical censures of the pope were able to force the excommunicated Peter of Aragon to restore Sicily to the House of Anjou.

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[7] *Ibid.*, 1339, Nos. 44–58.
[8] *Ibid.*, 1338, No. 48.
[9] Daumet, No. 581.
[10] Raynaldus, 1339, No. 59.

This is the one occasion when Benedict advocated what might be considered strictly offensive warfare. However, since Peter was a heretic, it was proper for the pope as head of Christendom to levy ecclesiastical tenths to aid in war on him. On the other hand, the pope in this case tacitly recognized war as the last resort after all peaceful measures had failed.

In Italian affairs, Benedict refused to follow his predecessor's policy of supporting Guelph against Ghibelline in order to bolster the declining papal power. His policy was to break up the imperial power in Italy by detaching from Louis of Bavaria and his imperial vicars the various Italian cities which in John XXII's time had been promptly interdicted for their support of heretics. Benedict tried, in short, to outbid the emperor by stressing the advantages of reconciliation with the Holy See rather than the disadvantages of adhering to the imperial party. He sought, moreover, to restore tranquility in Italy in order to pave the way for the eventual return of the papacy.

We have already referred to the disturbances in Bologna which made it impossible for Benedict to transfer the papal court there.[11] In 1337, the pope sent Bertrand de Deuce, Archbishop of Embrun, to exhort the citizens of Bologna to return to papal obedience. The nuncio, however, was unable to accomplish his mission by strictly peaceful means. Accordingly the pope published a bull revoking the privileges of the university of Bologna and ordering all professors and students to leave the university on pain of excommunication. The magistrates and chief citizens of Bologna, including the powerful Thaddeus Pepoli, were summoned to appear before the pope in three months.[12]

The following year envoys from Bologna were sent to the pope who received them in consistory. They asked his clemency, acknowledging that their city and its territory belonged entirely to the Holy See. They further promised not to receive Louis of Bavaria nor any emperor without papal permission. Thereupon Benedict commissioned Guigue de St. Germain to take possession of Bologna in his name, to raise the interdict, to re-establish the

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[11] *Ante*, p. 15.
[12] Raynaldus, 1337, No. 29; G. Villani, x, 69.

university of Bologna, and to give absolution.[13] In 1340, the city again sent two ambassadors to the pope asking him to grant to the city as administrator of the rights of the Holy See, Thaddeus Pepoli who, albeit through civil war, had already obtained the chief authority in Bologna. Benedict, accepting the proposal, sent Beltrarmin, Bishop of Coma, to establish Thaddeus as governor of Bologna for three years.[14]

A similar policy was pursued by the pope in obtaining the reconciliation of certain cities in Lombardy which had formerly supported the emperor and the anti-pope Peter de Corbaria. An embassy was sent to Benedict on behalf of these cities which declared that they would submit to papal orders regarding excesses committed against the Holy See; that they did not believe the emperor had the power to depose one pope and make a new one, a theory they now held to be heretical. Finally, they promised to in no way adhere to Louis of Bavaria nor to any other schismatic, and asked papal pardon for having ever obeyed Louis and his vicar, Matthew Visconti, as well as for having received the legates of Peter of Corbaria. The citizens of Novarre, Verceil, and Come were thereupon absolved of ecclesiastical censures and restored to the favour of the church.[15]

The Visconti family which had incurred papal condemnation through their allegiance to Louis of Bavaria, now tried to win the favour of Benedict. Toward the end of the pontificate, Matthew Visconti's sons, John and Luke, sent Guidole de Calice of Milan to the pope, charged to make the submission of the two brothers to the Holy See. The promises they made were similar to those made by the people of Bologna, besides which the Visconti offered to pay the pope and cardinals an indemnity of 50,000 gold florins for the crimes done by the family to papal legates. Finally, they recognized that during the vacancy of the empire as it was now by papal theory vacant, its administration properly belonged to the Holy See. Consequently, the envoy offered the pope the government of Milan and its dependencies. Benedict—apparently in imitation of Louis of Bavaria's tactics—thereupon appointed

[13] Raynaldus, 1338, No. 30.
[14] *Ibid.*, 1338, Nos. 39, 60.
[15] *Ibid.*, 1340, No. 69.

John and Luke Visconti vicars of the Roman Church during the vacancy of the empire and entrusted to them the government of Milan and its territory. As a penalty, however, for their past misdeeds, the Visconti were ordered to build two chapels in honour of St. Benedict where a priest should say daily mass at a certain salary to be paid by the Visconti; and alms were to be given by them to 2,000 poor people on the Feast of St. Benedict. On the fulfilment of these and the former conditions the interdict and all ecclesiastical censures were lifted.[16]

Similarly, Benedict recognized the conquests of the La Scala family against whom Florence and Venice had leagued together with a group of Guelph cities.[17] The La Scala, formerly imperial vicars in Italy, made their peace with the Holy See on conditions similar to those exacted from the Visconti of Milan and Pepoli of Bologna. Benedict, pursuing the same policy, accepted the offers of the La Scala and appointed them vicars of the Roman Church during the vacancy of the empire, giving them the administration of the cities they had already acquired. On the performance of certain penances, the interdict and all ecclesiastical censures were to be removed.[18]

Thus the pope was successful in obtaining the submission of certain Italian cities to the Holy See. In appointing these various family representatives as his vicars in Italy, he required in each case that they promise to renounce their civil wars.[19] Although they promised in every case to do so, civil war could not be avoided for long merely by papal recognition of authority won by conquest, and the conversion of the conquerors from the Ghibelline to the Guelph party.

The pope had more difficulty in restoring even temporary peace to the city of Rome. In July, 1335, he sent the Bishop of Embrun there to appeal to the Roman factions to unite in the cause of peace.[20] In March, 1336, truces were confirmed between the Orsini and Colonna which were to last for two years.[21] A

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[16] *Ibid.*, 1341, No. 20.
[17] *Ante*, p. 8.
[18] Raynaldus, 1339, Nos. 62, 67.
[19] *Ibid.*, 1339, No. 61, ff.; 1341, No. 19, ff.
[20] Fierens, No. 184.
[21] Theiner, *Codex Diplomaticus*, II, 21.

year later, the truces were prolonged,[22] through the mediation of the papal legate and the pope himself who had been made Senator.[23] In January, 1338, however, the Senators of Rome informed the pope concerning the renewed civil war that had broken out, offering to make restitution for the bridges and towers destroyed, and announcing the publication of new truces between the Colonna and Orsini.[24]

In April, Benedict took steps to punish those who had broken the truces, by sending Jacob of Gabrielli and Boso Novelli to sit in judgment against the violators of the pacts.[25] They were given power to demand restitution for damages done by those who had broken the truce and were instructed to diligently seek out the offenders.[26] At the same time the pope wrote to the Governor and Commune of Perugia insisting that they give no aid to the nobles or populace of Rome so that peace might result from inability to prosecute war.[27] Hugo Augerius, the rector, was given power to zealously prevent by apostolic authority the forming of long treaties between nobles which might lead them to give aid or favour to those who objected to the truces between the Colonna and Orsini.[28]

In spite of Benedict's attempts to break up the support to war, in 1340 renewed strife broke out when the Orsini attempted to drive out the newly appointed senators, Tibaldo and Martin who, at Benedict's request, were planning to punish some of the leading citizens who had broken the truces. The pope immediately sent his nuncio empowered to use spiritual censures against those who had expelled the senators, and order was finally restored.[29] Benedict had hoped by appointing as Senators representatives from both the Colonna and Orsini to restore order. Unfortunately he had to abandon the policy because of the continued enmity between the two families.[30] Considering the

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[22] *Ibid.*, II, 43.
[23] F. Gregorovius, *History of Rome in the Middle Ages*, VI, 197.
[24] Vidal, *Benoît XII, 1334–1342, lettres communes*, II, No. 6437.
[25] *Ibid.*, II, No. 6362.
[26] Theiner, *op. cit.*, II, 35.
[27] Vidal, II, No. 9487.
[28] *Ibid.*, II, No. 6363.
[29] Theiner, *op. cit.*, II, 107.
[30] Gregorovius, *op. cit.*, vi, 201, Note 2.

pope's policy in appointing the Visconti, La Scala, and others as his vicars elsewhere, it may be suggested that had either one of the factions at Rome triumphed completely, Benedict would have been able to restore temporary peace by making the triumphant family his vicar at Rome. However, since the Orsini and Colonna were fairly evenly matched, the restoration of peace was impossible, since both sides thought they could obtain more through battle.

In Spain also there were conflicts which sprang from family disputes which threatened to involve the peninsula in serious war. Peter IV of Aragon and his step-mother, Leonore, were at odds because the latter wished to secure some inheritance for her sons. In January, 1336, the pope wrote the queen expressing his sorrow at the situation which might result in straining the relations between Castile and Aragon.[31] At the same time he wrote in a similar vein to Peter exhorting him to make his peace with Leonore.[32] By this time, however, Alphonso XI of Castile, irate at the treatment of Leonore, opened hostilities against Peter. Thereupon the pope sent two nuncios to Aragon and Castile to try to make peace between them. Should peace prove impossible of attainment, the legates were to try to obtain at least the suspension of war.[33] By the end of the year, however, Peter had settled his differences with Leonore, and the war with Castile died out.[34]

Meanwhile, a conflict had broken out between Portugal and Castile due to the irritation felt by Alphonso IV of Portugal because of the treatment accorded his daughter, Maria, by her husband Alphonso XI of Castile, who wished to put her aside.[35] Benedict promptly sent Bertrand, bishop of Raten, to try to make peace,[36] and exhorted the kings to compose their differences in view of the Moorish menace.[37] At the same time Philip VI of France sent the Archbishop of Rheims to try to persuade the two

[31] Raynaldus, 1336, No. 50. Leonore was a sister of Alphonso XI.
[32] *Ibid.*, 1336, No. 51.
[33] *Ibid.*, 1336, No. 49.
[34] *Ibid.*, 1337, No. 25. An alliance against the Moors was made by the two kings the following year.
[35] J. Mariana, *Histoire générale d'Espagne*, II, 437, ff.
[36] Raynaldus, 1337, No. 25.
[37] *Ibid.*, 1339, No. 72.

kings to peace. Unfortunately, Alphonso XI had recently defeated the Portuguese fleet in a battle off Lisbon,[38] and was not at first willing to listen to either the French or papal proposals. On the contrary, the king of Castile now proceeded to invade Portugal. However, the Portuguese, possibly intimidated by their naval defeat, refused to give battle, and Alphonso was forced to retire. Nevertheless the following year he was persuaded to consent to a truce for one year.[39]

Meanwhile a conflict had broken out between Peter of Aragon and James III of Majorca, his vassal.[40] Because Peter's strength far exceeded that of James, no lasting war resulted, since Peter was able to make good his claim to Majorca. This was one of the few purely feudal disputes in which Benedict intervened. He did so however, only to the extent of urging Peter and James to make peace in view of the probable invasion of the Moors.[41]

This invasion which had been threatening for some years finally occurred. However the kings of the Spanish peninsula in view of their common danger united one by one and in October, 1340, managed to defeat the Moors near Tarifa.[42] The pope in high glee congratulated them on their glorious triumph over the infidel and their sturdy defense of the Catholic faith.[43] It may be wondered, however, if the kings were impressed as much by the necessity of defending their faith as by that of self-preservation.

While papal efforts for peace were attended in Sicily, Italy, and Spain with more success than in the north of Europe, their success was temporary at best. In Sicily, the pope was forced to have recourse to the principle of war against heretics; and in Spain it was the prospect of war with the infidel that finally caused the kings to make peace with one another. In Italy the pope won over some of the cities but only by recognizing military conquest as a basis for peace, a principle which the Italians later repudiated by battle.

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[38] Mariana, *op. cit.*, III, 438.
[39] *Ibid.*, III, 444.
[40] *Chron. del Rey D. Pedro IV el Ceremonioso* (ed. Zurita), 137–188.
[41] Raynaldus, 1339, Nos. 73, 74.
[42] Murimuth, 267, ff.; *Grandes Chron.*, V, 406, ff.
[43] Raynaldus, 1340, No. 40; *Chronica de D. Alfonso XI*, 1, cap. CCLVII *Chron. des Quatre Premiers Valois*, 11–12; *Chron. del Rey D. Pedro IV*, 142, ff.

VI

Conclusions

Benedict it will be noticed, used a variety of methods in his attempts to make peace. In the first place, he tried to divert the attention of Christian princes from their secular wars by furthering religious crusades against non-Christians, be they infidels or heretics. Thus he proposed a crusade against the Turks, and urged the expulsion of the Moors from Spain and Sicily. He stimulated opposition to heretics in at least three cases. To Philip VI of France he granted ecclesiastical tenths to be used against the heretical invaders of his kingdom. He granted the same to Robert of Naples, whom he advised to seize Sicily by force from the excommunicated Peter of Aragon. Finally, he granted ecclesiastical tenths to the kings of Spain to use to expel the infidel Moors. War was to be the scourge of non-Christians, and peace the prerogative of the faithful.

A second method used by the pope to further peace was the exercising of the papal prerogatives of excommunication and interdict. These had been used, as we have seen, to penalize the warlike, to discourage bellicose alliances, and to punish rebels. Thus in Flanders, the interdict was used to force the acceptance of Louis of Nevers; in Germany, to force the rejection of Louis of Bavaria; and in Italy, to compel the acceptance and maintenance of various truces.

The pope also used papal power to issue dispensations as a means of preventing war. The cardinal nuncios, Peter and Bertrand, sent to England and France, were ordered to dissolve all pacts which might nourish discord. Dispensations were also granted by the pope in over twenty cases for the marriage of persons related in the prohibited degrees, for the express purpose of quieting or ending wars between either the parties themselves or

their relatives.[1] On the other hand the pope could and did withhold dispensations when he thought the granting of them might promote discord. Thus when it was proposed that Edward III's son marry the Duke of Brabant's daughter, the pope disapproved.[2]

However, the method used most frequently as a peace measure was the sending of papal letters and legates upholding the cause. The legates were either special or ordinary. The former were generally important clerics, often bishops and occasionally cardinals, who had had some diplomatic experience. They were sent for the sole purpose of making peace. Occasionally, however, the pope made use of the clergy residing in the country at war possibly on the theory that they might have more influence with the local king. The Archbishops of Rouen, of Sens and of Canterbury were thus employed. In cases where speed was a factor, Benedict sent envoys of lesser rank because they could travel more quickly and their upkeep was less.

It was by his own letters and instructions to his nuncios that the pope worked out his peace campaign. His arguments against war and in favour of peace varied appropriately with the case he was treating at the time. He frequently appealed to fear; the uncertainty of war; the imminent invasion of infidels, heretics, or the opposing party to a struggle. Thus he warned Edward III of of the military advantages possessed by Philip; he advised Philip to wait until he was attacked. He urged the Spanish to conserve their military power to use against the colossal strength of the Saracens. The pope often appealed to both the religious and practical sentiments of the two parties. In glowing colours he painted the political advantages of a Franco-English alliance against the heretical Louis of Bavaria. Moreover, he earnestly sought to avoid antagonizing either party to a war. A conspicuous example of this policy was his blaming the Flemings and other "evil counsel" for Edward's assumption of the title to the French throne. He believed that it would be easier to mediate between

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[1] Vidal, I, Nos. 4839, 3637, 3668, 2144, 4834, 4826, 4830; II, Nos. 7219 7224, 7250, 7254, 7218, 6120, 8059, 7269, 7268, 8907, 8904, 8910, 8912, 8917 8900, 8090.

[2] Daumet, 621. This dispensation was not actually asked for, however.

two parties which were friendly to the Holy See than between two which were suspicious of it. Hence he sought to convince Edward of his continued regard for him even though he disapproved of the king's policies. In Italy likewise he sought to obtain the rôle of mediator by first obtaining the reconciliation of various Italian cities with the Holy See.

In spite of his labours for peace, Benedict was seldom successful. His failures were in a large measure due to the stubbornness of others. That his efforts were not entirely ignored by secular princes may be due in slight measure to their lingering if lessening veneration for his position, but perhaps even more to their wholesome respect for the financial resources he commanded. The fact that the pope could order the levying of tenths on ecclesiastical goods lent weight to his word. Crusades generally involved the granting of ecclesiastical tenths for the financing of the holy war. Once the grant was made, it proved extremely difficult for the pope, as we have seen, to obtain the restitution of the funds collected, in case he should abandon the crusade. Order after order Benedict sent out—to England, France, Spain, Italy, wherever tenths were collected—to implore or threaten princes that they might be induced to restore the holy money collected.

Moreover, Benedict's love of peace together with his hatred of heretics make him the prey of secular princes who persuaded the pope to excommunicate their private enemies and then solicited ecclesiastical funds from him to make war on the newly-created heretics. Robert of Naples thus constantly urged Benedict to excommunicate Peter of Aragon. Although the latter through his own actions rendered himself liable to excommunication, Benedict gave him every chance to make his peace with the Church. When, however, Peter's obstinacy precluded peace, the pope finally pronounced excommunication. The next step was the granting of ecclesiastical tenths to Robert to be used in making war on infidels and heretics. The latter category now of course included Peter, Robert's political enemy. However the pope could not logically refuse Robert's plea to be allowed to oust Peter from Sicily.

Benedict, therefore, was not an absolute pacifist. He believed in the desirability of war in certain cases. In Sicily he countenanced

war as a last resort, thereby accepting it as an international policy. He did not believe in peace at any price, for he generally upheld treaties whose provisions could not but cause war since they frequently sanctioned conquests made through battle. Thus the pope's desire to quiet Italy and bring it back to its obedience to the Holy See caused him to tacitly recognize war as a just policy. The La Scala, Visconti, Pepoli—all had reached their heights of power through military conquest. Benedict not only accepted them all, but made them his representatives in Italy.

It may be questioned to what extent the pope showed partiality in dealing with the warring princes of the time. His power to grant tenths to certain princes who he considered were being menaced by infidels or heretics laid him open to the charge of partiality. As we have seen, Edward was convinced that Benedict favoured Philip because of the granting of ecclesiastical tenths to the king of France. In vain the pope explained that Philip was beset by heretics. Probably one reason Benedict refrained from authorizing the breaking of treaties was that he feared the accusation of partiality. Even the ill-founded rumor that the pope had dispensed the Counts of Juliers and Gueldres from their oaths to Philip caused the latter to charge the pope with enmity toward France.

Benedict, because of both his position and his temperament was inclined to be reactionary. He upheld the *status quo*. Rebellion was wrong not only because it often led to bloodshed, but because God had placed power in the hands of certain princes who by that very fact ought to be obeyed. The pope refused to admit that these princes or governments had used war somewhere along the line as a practical supplement to the intentions of God. Thus the Flemings were a faithless lot because they rebelled against their lord.

It must be admitted, however, that at times Benedict showed a keen understanding of the conditions which made for war. He realized that the crux of the Anglo-French conflict lay in the possession of Aquitaine, but it was incomprehensible to him that Edward and Philip both christians, should desire to aggrandize themselves at each other's expense. The pope also estimated Edward's allies for what they were worth. He knew even better

than the king that his allies were using English money and English men to fight their own wars. In fact, the pope saw clearly the motives behind the diplomacy of others, yet failed to appreciate their mercenary motives in dealing with himself.

Benedict's efforts for peace may easily be criticised. He did not realize that it was more difficult to make a just peace than a just war. War at least decided between the military strength of two parties; peace, being the negation of war, decided nothing. Truces were almost invariably regarded at this time as a breathing-space between wars, a time in which to increase the efficiency of one's military preparations. The pope perhaps sacrificed the hope of lasting peace to the cause of a temporary truce. Benjamin Franklin to the contrary, there was such a thing as a bad peace. Benedict made not only one but several. His reconciliation with the various Italian tyrants brought a short respite from war, but laid the groundwork for continued and even more embittered struggles. Not that the pope perhaps realized this himself. He sought to stop the shedding of Christian blood, even for a little while. Unfortunately for the cause of peace, Benedict's efforts for it were too often hampered by his own good intentions.

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The most important source of information for this subject is the correspondence of the pope and the princes concerned. Papal letters relating to France have been collected for this period by M. Georges Daumet who includes also many of Philip VI's letters to Benedict XII. For England, there is the Calendar of papal letters (ed. Bliss, Twemlow, and others). Many of these letters are given in full in Rymer's *Foedera*, some of them are in Daumet's collection, and a few are given by certain English chroniclers, notably Avesbury, Walsingham, and Hemingburgh. For Flanders, there is the collection of papal letters edited by Fierens. In Raynaldus' continuation of Baronius' *Annales* are to be found papal letters relating to Spain and Germany. For Italy, there is Theiner's *Codex Diplomaticus* which is supplemented by Vidal's *Lettres communes*.

While the various chronicles of the period are occasionally helpful, they are secondary in importance to the correspondence. Only indeed when they include state documents and royal and papal letters not to be found elsewhere, are they of much value for this subject. For the most part the English, French, and Flemish chroniclers are more concerned with the progress of war than that of peace. Ecclesiastical affairs in general are given less attention than in the chronicles of the preceding centuries probably because the chroniclers of this period are more often laymen or secular clerks than monks. The most important exception is the *Chronographia regum francorum* which is unusually full on ecclesiastical affairs.

For Spain, Italy, and Germany, the chroniclers are occupied more with local affairs than international problems. The Spanish chronicles contain long accounts of the Moorish invasion and the domestic difficulties of the Spanish kings, while papal efforts for peace, if mentioned at all, receive scant comment. The Italian chronicles are filled with accounts of family feuds while the pope, being an absentee, is either ignored as an international figure or villified because of his reforming measures. Villani seems to be the only chronicler who has a great deal to say about papal efforts for peace, and their effect on Italy he deplores. It is Villani however, who gives us the most complete account of the interesting circumstances attending the election of Benedict. The German chroniclers give no little space to ecclesiastical affairs, but they are primarily—almost exclusively—concerned with Louis of Bavaria's various attempts at reconciliation with the Holy See. This subject has been so adequately and admirably treated by C. Muller that I have refrained as much as possible from including it in this paper. Papal efforts for peace were confined to the faithful and did not include heretics.

Of the modern works I have listed the most important for my subject are Déprez' *Les Préliminaires de la Guerre de Cent Ans*, and Lucas' *The Low Countries and the Hundred Years' War* in both of which the events leading up to and including the early stage of the war are described in detail thus contributing the necessary background of war on which may be superimposed papal efforts for peace. Although the Avignonese popes in general have yet to be adequately treated by historians, M. Daumet has written an excellent account of the life and work of Benedict XII in the introduction to his *Lettres closes* . . . Daumet's judgment upon the pope differs markedly from that of Déprez who is apt to regard him as an egotistical, ambitious opportunist. The other papal histories I have listed—by Mollat, Creighton, Pastor, and Rocquain - are unfortunately too general in scope to give more than a cursory survey of the pontificate of Benedict XII.

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